Early effects and legacies of Cape Colony  legislation on black disenfranchisement, education and migration by Nyika, Farai Donald
EARLY EFFECTS AND LEGACIES OF CAPE COLONY 
LEGISLATION ON BLACK DISENFRANCHISEMENT, 
EDUCATION AND MIGRATION 
By 
Farai D. Nyika 
Dissertation presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Economics) in the 
Faculty of Economics and Management Sciences at the University of Stellenbosch 
Supervisor: Prof. Johan Fourie (Stellenbosch University) 
Co-supervisor: Dr Debra Shepherd (Stellenbosch University) 
i   
        
 
 




By submitting this dissertation electronically, I declare that the entire work contained herein 
is my own, original work, that I am the sole author thereof (save to the extent explicitly 
otherwise stated), that reproduction and publication thereof by Stellenbosch University will 
not infringe any third-party rights and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part 
submitted it for obtaining any qualification. 
Signature: F. D. Nyika 

























Copyright © 2021 Stellenbosch University 
All rights reserved 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
ii   
ABSTRACT 
The Cape Colony adopted a universal male franchise in 1853, which was subject to income and 
property qualifications. This decision created tensions amongst the white settler community. 
After several annexations of black territories had enlarged the Cape Parliament’s sphere of 
control, black people were deemed a political threat and could eventually rule the Cape Colony 
as they far outnumbered white people. The Cape Parliament subsequently passed laws that 
aimed to disenfranchise black voters, restructure local government and segregate black people 
in the Transkei and drove them into migrant labour.  
In this dissertation, I analysed the impact of two legislative Acts that were aimed at 
curtailing black suffrage, (1887 Cape Parliamentary Registration Act and the 1892 Franchise 
and Ballot Act) on the number of voter registrations. I used the transcribed and digitised Cape 
Colony voters’ rolls to question the accuracy of claims made by several writers about the 
numbers of black people who lost the right to vote. I found that the number of black people 
removed from the rolls to be much smaller that is claimed by the literature.  
I also studied the impact of the 1894 Glen Grey Act was passed to restructure black local 
government by creating black administered District Councils. I studied the impact of District 
Councils on black education in the Transkei and showed that black primary school attendance 
and enrolment rose faster in districts that established Councils than in districts that did not.  
Finally, as the Glen Grey Act contributed to the phenomenon of migrant labour from the 
Transkei, I studied the long-run consequences of the legislation. I did this by examining the 
relationship between internal migration and non-migrant primary and secondary completion in 
four South African provinces a century after the introduction of the legislation. I found some 
evidence of long-run persistence.  
This dissertation makes new contributions to the literature on South African political and 
economic history, colonial and present-day education.  
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OPSOMMING 
Die Britse Kaapkolonie het stemreg vir mans met sekere inkomste en eiendomsvereistes in 1853 
aanvaar. Hierdie besluit het konflik in die wit setlaarsgemeenskap veroorsaak. Die anneksasie 
van grensgebiede het die hoeveelheid swart inwoners wat deur die Kaapse parlement 
verteenwoordig word beduidend laat toeneem. Wit kiesiers het dit as ‘n bedreiging gesien. 
Verskeie wette is dus afgedwing om die getal swart kiesers te verminder. 
In hierdie verhandeling ondersoek ek die impak van twee wette wat ten doel gehad het 
om die getal swart kiesers te verminder. Ek gebruik gedigitiseerde en getranskribeerde 
Kaapkolonie stemrolle om die bestaande literatuur oor die getal swart kiesers wat van die 
stemrolle verwyder is te bevraagteken. Met die stemrolle tot my beskikking vind ek dat die getal 
swart kiesers wat van die rolle verwyder is baie kleiner was as die konsensus in die bestaande 
literatuur. 
Die 1894 Glen Grey Wetsontwerp is deurgevoer om die bestuur van plaaslike owerhede 
in swart distrikte te herstruktureer. Dit het spesifiek ‘n klousule ingesluit om distriksrade te skep. 
Ek ondersoek die impak van hierdie distriksrade op onderwys in die Transkei. Ek vind dat 
bywoningssyfers van swart kinders in laerskole vinniger toegeneem het in distrikte met 
distriksrade. 
Laastens ondersoek ek die verwantskap tussen hierdie historiese migrasiepatrone en nie-
migrasie primêre en sekondêre onderrig in vier provinsies van Suid-Afrika. Dit is omdat die Glen 
Grey Wetsontwerp bygedra het tot arbeidsmigrasie uit die Transkei. Ek vind beduidende bewyse 
van die langtermyneffek van die Glen Grey Wetsontwerp op onderwysuitkomste vandag. 
Die verhandeling maak bydraes tot die literatuur oor Suid-Afrikaanse politieke en 
ekonomiese geskiedenis en die verwantskap tussen koloniale en onlangse onderwysuitkomste. 
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Background to the dissertation 
Globally, democratic gains are increasingly being eroded and sometimes even reversed by anti-
democratic processes such as voter disenfranchisement, autocratisation, populist movements 
and illiberal policies. Some notable examples include the banning of opposition parties in 
several African countries, Turkey and Russia. Instead of military coups d’état, it has become 
increasingly common to see democratic processes being subverted by ballot rigging, attacks on 
media freedom, voter disenfranchisement and even the mass incarceration of people (e.g. 
China) (Bermeo, 2016; Waldner and Lust, 2018: 1096). This is evident in both established and 
transitioning democracies.   
While as of 2017, only 12% of all nations were considered full autocracies in which 
elections were never held (compared to 50% in 1980) and in a world of binary outcomes, most 
countries that experience democratic reversals are still democratic. But instead of thinking in 
terms of binary outcomes it is perhaps more useful to think of political systems as existing on 
a continuum, ranging from closed autocracies to full-fledged democracies. This will suggest 
that what we have been witnessing is a shift along a continuum, from full-fledged democracies 
to countries using various means to frustrate the democratic process by reducing 
competitiveness within the electoral system (Schedler, 2015; Lührmann, Tannenberg and 
Lindberg, 2018). 
History teaches us that democratic reversals often occur during periods of 
democratisation and enfranchisement (Huntington, 1991; Lührmann et al. 2018; Schenoni & 
Mainwaring, 2019). Such mass enfranchisement episodes or ‘waves,’ can be considered “a 
group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes “that occur within a specified 
period and significantly outnumber” the democratic reversals that occur afterward (Huntington 




democratisation accelerated from the 1820s onwards after the removal of electoral property 
requirements, leading to nearly all white males being enfranchised. During the post-Civil War 
reconstruction effort, black American males were also enfranchised by the 15th Amendment, 
although their enfranchisement was accompanied by property and literacy requirements aimed 
at limiting the extent of their electoral participation (Zinkina et al. 2017: 581). The Cape 
Colony, several European countries, Canada and Argentina also established democratic 
institutions before 1900.1  
In the midst of what appeared to have been a global democratisation process, several 
countries underwent a reversal of their democracies during the nineteenth century. In the USA, 
Southern disenfranchisement began in the 1870s and by 1908, nearly all black American males 
had been removed from electoral rolls through a combination of fraud, violence, taxes, property 
requirements and literacy tests (Tuck, 2007).2 By the late 1800s, Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand all had restricted or banned indigenous people from voting (Martin, 2005; Australian 
Electoral Commission, 2016) while the Cape Colony reversed its democracy by 
disenfranchising black men through three legislative Acts in 1887, 1892 and 1894 (DHA, 1891, 
329).  
The Cape’s democratic reversal began after some of its leaders voiced their concerns 
about the large number of black people who had become citizens after black territories were 
annexed into the Cape. Several Cape leaders feared that black people who vastly outnumbered 
white people, would win parliamentary elections. The 1887 Cape Parliamentary Registration 
Act introduced private land ownership and prevented black men from using communally 
owned land in order to register for the qualified franchise. The 1892 Franchise and Ballot Act 
introduced a reading and writing test as a voting registration requirement. Many black men 
                                                     
 




were disenfranchised as they were largely illiterate in comparison to white men.  
Cape Colony democratic reversal went beyond removing voters from rolls. The Cape 
Parliament also passed the Glen Grey Act that segregated black people and created institutions 
that were the pre-cursor to those common during apartheid (Edgecombe, 1976; Lacey, 1981; 
(Rotberg 1988, 467, 477). According to Thompson and Nicholls (1993: 58), the Glen Grey Act 
“addressed the questions of land tenure, political administration and representation, labour 
extraction.” Part III of the Act required traditional black communally owned land to be replaced 
by individual titles, but these individual titles could not be used to register for the Cape’s 
parliamentary elections.  
Part V of the Glen Grey Act created local District Councils that had broad administrative 
and taxation powers and black men were to vote for district councillors instead of Cape 
parliamentarians. The law also required individual land titles to be inherited by primogeniture 
(to force younger men to seek white employment) and introduced a hut tax for all black men 
who had not worked for white employers for at least three months in a year. These clauses had 
the effect of stimulating migrant labour from the Transkei to work in mining, industry and 
agriculture in the northern and western parts of the Cape. Taxes raised by DCs were used to 
fund administration, the development and upkeep of various types of infrastructure, schools 
and veterinary services.  
 
Previous research on the economic effects of democratic reversal 
Democratic reversal invariably has economic consequences. Since the work done by Kousser 
(1974; 1980) and Margo (1986; 1990) on Southern disenfranchisement and education, these 
consequences have generally received little attention. That said, the past decade has witnessed 
renewed interest in economic history related to democratic reversals. In what follows, I briefly 
discuss some of the most salient of these recent analyses.  




and poor white people in the period 1870 to 1910. He found that property owners in 
disenfranchised counties benefitted as land values rose significantly more than in counties that 
were not disenfranchised. He also found that after disenfranchisement, the teacher-student ratio 
increased for black people while it remained unchanged for white people.  
Henderson (2017) explores the effects that disenfranchisement had on immigrants to the 
United States in the period 1864 to 1926, finding that disenfranchisement had a negative effect 
on immigrant children’s education. Immigrants’ chances of finding work diminished and their 
wages were ten percentage points lower than those of citizens.  
Finally, Jensena and Yntiso (2019) have studied the impact of democratic reversal on 
taxation by focusing on the disenfranchisement of black Americans in the late 19th century 
southern United States. Their results show a negative correlation between disenfranchisement 
measures (such as literacy tests and poll taxes) and state taxation revenues.  
 
Research problem 
All the studies referred to above provide evidence of the effects of democratic reversal in the 
southern United States - a region which, during the nineteenth century, had similar formal and 
informal institutions to those of the Cape Colony. To the best of my knowledge, the economic 
effects of the Cape’s democratic reversal, the effect of the Cape’s restructuring of black local 
government, and the legacy of the Glen Grey Act have not been studied. I believe that the Cape 
Colony provides a useful case study of (some of) the economic effects that democratic reversals 
have for understanding the consequences of similar processes today.  
Scant attention has been paid to the Transkei in much of the empirical work that has been 
done on the development of the Cape Colony. Although the historical work done by Bundy and 
Beinart in the 1970s and 80s and that of Ntsebeza (2005) inform my analysis, little econometric 
work has been done on black people in the Transkei.  




had existed for thirty-three years before the process of disenfranchisement was initiated. By 
comparison, black Americans were permitted to vote for only six years before 
disenfranchisement began in 1876. Cape democratic reversal is further of interest since it 
occurred after a period of significant democratic consolidation which demonstrates the 
important fact that established democratic orders are prone to democratic reversals.  
The aim of this dissertation is to investigate more fully Cape Colony’s democratic 
reversal, economic and political exclusion, and the general immediate and persistent effects 
this had on the education and migration of black people.  
 
Research objectives 
Against this background, the research objectives of this study are threefold. In the first instance, 
it will critically review the literature on Cape Colony disenfranchisement with reference to, 
among others, the Cape Colony voters’ rolls and, through an analysis of the number of black 
and white voters on the rolls, measure the extent of the disenfranchisement that was 
implemented for the period 1886 to 1909. In the second instance, it will analyse the effects that 
District Councils had on primary school outcomes (enrolment and attendance) in the Transkei 
for the period 1886 to 1909. In the third and last instance it will investigate the relationship (if 
any) between post-1994 education outcomes (both primary and secondary) and internal 
migration for the period 2000 to 2013, with specific focus paid to the persistence of migration 
as a channel through which the legacy of the Glen Grey Act might be assessed.  
 
Motivating the choice of the Transkei as the main study area 
There are several reasons why this dissertation focuses on the Transkei region of the Cape 
Colony. Firstly, the vast majority of black people lived in that part of the country between 1887 
to 1909. Secondly, it was also during this period that great political, educational and economic 




the Cape Colony. Finally, the focus on the Transkei is also due to the fact that there is relatively 
more colonial data available on the education of black people.  
 
Research design and methodology 
In terms of the design of this research project, I use the historical method of analysis. This 
involves the “systematic and objective location, evaluation and synthesis of evidence in order 
to establish facts and draw conclusions about past events” (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2007: 
191). Many modern economics dissertations make use mainly of quantitative methods. Given 
the nature of the three research objectives listed above, I chose to employ a mixed-methods 
approach which combines quantitative and qualitative methods. This integration while time-
consuming, produces reliable insights as the two methods are complementary and allow for the 
convergence of research results (Sabharwal and Malish, 2018; Johnson, 2006).  
While quantitative methods use statistical and econometric tests to assist in the analysis 
of numerical data in an attempt to identify hidden patterns through the application of deductive 
reasoning (Kamga, 2018), qualitative methods rely on the researcher’s skills to make sense of 
different narratives that were constructed by individuals who applied their own interpretation 
to certain phenomena (Kalof et al. 2008). In this study, qualitative research involved reviewing 
books, archival material and political debates in order to provide the contextual background to 
certain events discussed in the dissertation. While the qualitative approach is used to address 
the research question raised in Chapter One, econometric modelling is used to address the 
research question raised in Chapters Two and Three respectively. In the following section I 
briefly elaborate on each of these research questions.  
 
Research questions 
The first research question addressed in Chapter One can be formulated as: How effective was 




review and challenge the literature on black disenfranchisement in the late nineteenth century 
Cape Colony. The consensus view of disenfranchisement legislation is that it was largely 
successful in what it set out to achieve, i.e. to significantly reduce the number of black people 
who were eligible to vote. But, as I argue, the empirical support for this consensus is weak. I 
use a matching formula for names and surnames in combination with manual matching to count 
the number of black people listed on the Cape Colony voters’ rolls in the period 1887 to 1909. 
I argue that black voters targeted by changes in legislation may have responded in unforeseen 
ways and that disenfranchisement was not as ‘effective’ as previously claimed since the 
numbers in the literature on disenfranchisement appear to be exaggerated. The number of black 
people I identify who have lost the right to vote is substantially lower than the number 
suggested by existing literature.  
This is an important contribution because it essentially challenges the veracity of claims 
made about the effectiveness of disenfranchisement. To date, no scholar has systematically 
gone through the voters’ rolls in order, either to provide empirical evidence for the general 
consensus, or to advance and substantiate counter-claims about disenfranchisement. If the 
numbers were indeed lower than had previously been claimed, then that could be argued to say 
something more about black people’s response to sustained attacks on the franchise than about 
the legislation itself. I therefore also elaborate on black peoples’ efforts to resist removal from 
the voters’ rolls.  
The second research objective is to provide an answer to the following question: How 
did disenfranchisement indirectly affect black primary schooling in the Transkei? In order to 
answer this question, I explore the impact the Transkeian District Councils (DCs) had on black 
education in the Cape Colony’s Transkeian Territories.3 DCs were established by the Cape 
                                                     
3  The 'Transkeian Territories' include all the districts located between the Kei and Umzimkhulu Rivers as in the 
Cape Colony’s demarcations (Archives of Government House (G.H.), Cape Archives, Cape Town, Gazette No. 




government to partly recompense black people who had been disenfranchised by the Glen Grey 
Act of 1894.  
I also test the claim, made by Rhodes in 1893 and again by several school principals and 
inspectors in the 1908 Select Committee on Native Education (SCONE) hearings, that DCs 
would improve black education. These principals and inspectors stated that districts which 
received council status had higher enrolment and attendance figures than districts without such 
status. Chapter Two uses difference-in-difference (DID) estimation with fixed effects to 
determine the impact that councils may have had on enrolment and attendance figures. In my 
analysis I use districts that established councils (DCs) as the treatment group and districts that 
did not (non-DCs) as the control group. Leads and lags of the timing of the intervention are 
included given a staggered introduction of DCs.  
The regression results show that the former recorded higher enrolment and attendance 
figures than the latter. Since black people led these councils, improved organisation and 
administration of education led to improved enrolment and attendance. This highlights the issue 
of co-payment and the demand for education: DCs collected funds for school fees, but non-
DCs did not. Increased spending on education in DCs (with additional money raised by 
families) meant better-funded schooling and better outcomes. Government spending on 
education remained stable over the period covered by this chapter and yet outcomes improved. 
I also argue that education was used as a means of marketing a policy (DCs) to black people; 
a policy which ostensibly offered them increased autonomy but which in reality was part of a 
broader political strategy designed to assist Rhodes in retaining power. 
The third and final research objective is to address the following question: What is the 
long term effect of the Glen Grey Act on internal migration, and what are the implications of 
this channel of historical persistence on education outcomes today? This is where the Eastern 




general trends between internal migration and completion rates. As contemporary South Africa 
struggles with relatively low school completion rates compared to other nations of similar 
development (i.e. high middle-income), it is necessary to consider all factors that may be 
contributing to this problem. There is an abundance of literature on the causes of school 
dropouts in South Africa, but none of the studies have investigated the possible effects of 
internal migration on school completion rates.  
Historically, labour migration was strongly influenced by interventions such as the Glen 
Grey Act and other apartheid era measures, with the Eastern Cape being the largest sender 
province. One of the Glen Grey Act’s provisions was to levy a hut tax on all black males, in 
order to force black men to move from the Transkei and seek work in the mines, farms and 
industries. In the years following the Act, labour migration from Transkei accelerated. Chapter 
Three of this thesis, therefore, argues that present day migration from the Transkei is an indirect 
legacy of migration influenced by the Glen Grey Act.  
In Chapter Three I use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), First Difference and Generalised 
Method of Moments System (GMM-SYS) regressions to test the effect of internal migration 
on primary and secondary completion rates of non-migrants in KwaZulu-Natal, Gauteng, the 
Western Province and Eastern Cape. The main results are as follows: I did not find any 
relationship between internal migration and primary and secondary completion rates in the 
Eastern Cape. Primary and secondary school completion rates are also found to be lowest in 




In this study I made extensive use of secondary sources, including books, theses and 
dissertations. The Cape Colonial Blue Books, Statistical Registers, Cape Colony Censuses 




the Cape Colony voters’ rolls are the primary sources used. The annual Blue Books, Censuses 
and Statistical Registers are part of the Stellenbosch University library holdings.  
The Blue Books recorded almost all economic and social data on Cape citizens with a 
special section dedicated to black people, titled Native Affairs. I read the Native Affairs section 
to discover the views of the magistrates about the socio-economic developments in the Transkei 
districts that they governed. The Blue Books also contain the annual reports on education 
expenditure and school attendance and enrolment figures for the whole Cape Colony. I used 
the education reports to gather data for the analysis in Chapter Two.  
The Cape Colony Statistical Registers were mini-censuses conducted in non-census 
years. As there were three censuses (1891, 1904 and 1911) that fall within the time period 
demaracated for this study, the Statistical Registers were used to provide information on 
population and voter registrations for non-census years. In addition, I found valuable 
information on the workings of the Transkei Territories General Council in the Statistical 
Registers. The majority of the voters’ rolls’ eastern electoral divisions and magisterial districts 
(those from 1886 to 1896 and 1909) were digitised and transcribed to Excel and the information 
extracted. I transcribed much of the 1909 voter registrations to use for surname matching 
(Chapter One). The voters’ rolls are housed in the Western Cape Archives and Records in 
Gardens, Cape Town. A local photographer digitised the entire series for the period 1872 to 
1909 on my behalf.  
In Chapter Three I use publicly available nationally representative data sets, namely, the 




As with all research projects this study, too, has its limitations. Firstly, due to time and financial 




the eastern part of the Cape Colony for the entire period that I cover in this dissertation. In 
Chapter One, for instance, I did not have at my disposal transcriptions of districts to use in 
conjunction with a matching algorithm that links names and surnames over time. Instead, I 
manually identified and recorded the selected information (non-white names and surnames) 
necessary to complete the analysis. I do not believe that this impacts significantly on the 
validity of the results because isiXhosa names are easily identifiable. On the contrary, manual 
checking is a form of robustness checking and helps to identify possible false positive matching 
of non-white names and surnames. The task of digitising the Western and Northern electoral 
divisions and magisterial districts in the Cape Colony voters’ rolls must fall to future research.  
Secondly, in Chapter Two I have aggregated school attendance and enrolment figures at 
a district level. Ideally, I would have preferred to keep the data at school level in order to 
increase the statistical power of the model I used but still interpret the results at district level, 
as I do in Chapter Three. Owing to the rapidly changing nature of primary education in the 
Cape Colony in the 1890s, many schools were opening and closing soon after, making it 
difficult to collect data for the same school over the entire period. The Cape Colony also 
changed the way it reported data by aggregating all enrolment and attendance figures after the 
South African War, whereas it had previously been available at school level. As my main 
concern has been with establishing trends in educational outcomes, the data pooling approach 
that I have used will not negatively bias the direction of the results. 
 
Main contributions of the dissertation 
In my estimation, this dissertation makes an important data collection and methodological 
contribution by using micro-level observations from a previously unused source. The 
information gathered from the voters’ rolls suggests a different narrative to the widely accepted 
black disenfranchisement narrative. Through empirical means, I highlight the role of black 




did not record detailed data for black people to the same extent that they did for white people, 
economic historians have to be creative in identifying useful sources for their research (Fourie, 
2016). This dissertation also draws attention to the role of mass actors, that is, black citizens of 
the British Cape Colony, in the organisation and improvement of their children’s education 
outcomes despite the Cape government cutting back funding of black education. This 
demonstrates that black people were not simply passive recipients of colonial education. 
Finally, this dissertation shows the long term economic effects of Cape colonial policies, 
highlighting the importance of history for development. Broad reaching policies such as 
Rhodes’ Glen Grey Act can have indirect persistent effects and the channels through which 
they persist are important to study. This dissertation focuses on one channel of persistence 




CHAPTER ONE: CHALLENGING THE NARRATIVE OF 




In order to limit the black franchise in the Cape Colony, successive governments under Sir 
Gordon Sprigg (Prime Minister, 1886–90) and Cecil John Rhodes (Prime Minister, 1890–96) 
passed two Acts: The Cape Parliamentary Registration Act of 1887 and the Cape Franchise and 
Ballot Act of 1892.5 These Acts raised the requirements for voter eligibility and, according to 
contemporary commentators and subsequently, historians of the period, were clearly designed 
to remove black voters from the Cape Colony voters’ rolls. The literature on 
disenfranchisement produced in response to these two Acts is riddled with contradictory and 
inaccurate claims about the effectiveness of the legislation. Some estimates of the number of 
disenfranchised black voters are based on scant empirical evidence; other commentaries cite 
no evidence or recycle statistics from older sources. Over time, the estimates have come to be 
accepted without question. In this chapter, I point out discrepancies between accepted estimates 
and I recalculate the number of black people who were removed from the voters’ rolls. I find 
these discrepancies surprising given the fact that the voters’ rolls, which include the names of 
the voters and, from 1902 to 1909, their race, are easily accessible in the Cape Town Archives. 
This chapter is the first to offer a detailed analysis of the relevant statistics based on these 
voters’ rolls.   
To challenge the accounts in existing literature, I examined the voters’ rolls for the period 
1886 to 1895 to see how voter registrations changed over those years, that is, directly before 
                                                     
4 A version of this chapter has been published as follows: Nyika, F. & Fourie., J. 2020. Black Disenfranchisement 
in the Cape Colony, c.1887–1909: Challenging the Numbers, Journal of Southern African Studies, 46(3): 455-
469. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/03057070.2020.1741177. 
5 A third Act, the Glen Grey Act of 1894, had a clause that prevented black owned plots from being used to meet 
property requirements for the franchise qualifications. As disenfranchisement was a secondary focus of the Glen 
Grey Act, I do not consider it for purposes of this chapter. The two Acts I discuss in this chapter contributed to 




and after the two disenfranchisement Acts were passed. I used computing software for 
matching surnames to count the number of black voters in each voter registration year for each 
electoral division. This enabled me to produce a more accurate estimate of the true extent of 
black voter disenfranchisement.     
In existing literature, one strand of writing is represented by three left-wing writers who 
published during the early years of apartheid. According to Roux (1964: 67), ‘Ausi’ (1956: 11) 
and Mbeki (1964, 23-4), the 1887 Act disenfranchised 30,000 black voters or between 90 and 
95 percent of the black electorate. None of these authors were academic historians. Roux was 
a botanist, Mbeki a journalist and activist and ‘Ausi’ remains anonymous. Although these 
authors may well have had a political motive for overstating the effect of disenfranchisement 
there also exists, within historical scholarship proper, a tendency to repeat certain figures and 
in general to overstate the impact of the 1887 and 1892 Acts. Some of this scholarship is 
discussed in the section ‘Disagreements over Numbers Disenfranchised’ below. 
My findings suggest that the actual number of disenfranchised voters was significantly 
smaller than most accounts claim. I estimate that the 1887 Act reduced black voter registrations 
by between 2,800 and 3,000. My findings also indicate that the same Act disenfranchised more 
white and coloured than black voters.  
Mills (2005) has questioned the idea that the Registration Act of 1887 removed 20,000 
black people from the voters’ rolls and estimates that black voter numbers fell from around 
6,000–9,000 to 3,000–5,000 after introduction of the Act, that is, by some 50 percent. He based 
his estimation on extrapolations from the 1891 census numbers of registered white and 
coloured voters, as well as some voter registration numbers presented to the Cape parliament 
for six eastern electoral divisions for the years 1884 and 1886. In this study I extend Mills’ 
analysis by counting voter registrations from a broader set of data sources (the voters’ rolls), 




Cape, because many black people were employed in the diamond mines). In the 1880s and 
’90s, the majority of black people in the Cape Colony resided in the 15 electoral divisions. I 
also extended the time frame (1886–1895), covering disenfranchisement by the 1892 Act as 
well as the 1887 Act.  
This chapter complements the work by Feinberg and Horn (2009: 41–60) and Feinberg 
(2015) on black land purchases after the introduction of the Natives Land Act of 1913. Feinberg 
and Horn examine the extent to which black people succeeded in acquiring land outside the 
reserves by making use of an exception clause in the Land Act. Using previously unexplored 
sources such as the Governor General’s Reports to Parliament, property transfers and 
registration data and geo-referenced datasets of rural landholdings in the Transvaal, they found 
that between 1913 and 1936, black people purchased more than 3,200 farms and plots. They 
therefore argue that this Act did not succeed in significantly curtailing black land ownership in 
the Transvaal and that it failed to segregate black and white farmers who continued to live next 
to each other. This chapter shares with Feinberg et al. the assumption that one should not equate 
the outcome of legislation with its stated objectives.  
 
1.2 The Cape liberal tradition 
 
The nineteenth century Cape Colony’s franchise differed from that of Natal and the Boer 
Republics in its treatment of black people in the sense that it was the only non-racial, though 
qualified, franchise. All black and coloured men in the Cape could vote if they met certain 
stipulated thresholds of property and income. The Transvaal and the Orange Free State 
restricted the franchise to white men and Natal set the franchise qualifications so high that few 
non-white people ever attained it (Williams and Elliot, 1921: 205). In Natal, Africans were 
largely excluded from a common franchise by the stringent requirements of legislation enacted 
in 1865, and Indians were denied the vote altogether in 1896. By contrast, an inconsistent and 




which ‘is best known for the suffrage it created [in 1853]. This suffrage allowed people of 
African origins, initially Khoisan and then Nguni, to participate in colonial politics (Trapido, 
1980: 248) – this, no doubt, in part, because of the Cape’s Ordinance 50 of 1828 which 
prohibited racially discriminatory legislation (Ross, 1993: 131–48). The Cape maintained this 
principle of racial equality before the law after 1854 and for much of the nineteenth century 
although the franchise was not extended to women until 1930 - and then only to white women. 
The black franchise in the Cape ended with the passing of the Representation of Natives Act 
of 1936, which placed black people on a different voters’ roll. 
Class distinction in the Cape largely coincided with race. What we today call racially 
discriminatory legislation, British politics labelled class legislation and it was biased against 
lower classes. Race and racial conflict in the Cape Colony were mostly discussed in terms of 
the white races, the English and Dutch, while many who belonged to the coloured classes 
became a subordinate working class ultimately to be culturally assimilated into the dominant 
white class. 
Black people predominantly inhabited the regions that were annexed to the Cape 
Colony’s territory in 1848, 1879 and 1885 and which became known as the Ciskei and 
Transkei. After the annexations, hundreds of thousands of black people were incorporated into 
the Cape Colony. Many black people were more socially and economically independent than 
the majority of coloured people and the non-racial franchise did not raise much concern until 
large numbers of black people began to register as voters in the late 1870s and early ’80s. The 
1880s Cape Hansard parliamentary debates show that many white politicians, including those 
who considered themselves liberals, were concerned about the black franchise (H.O.A, 1884, 
64–72). While some argued that black people should be placed on a separate register entirely, 
others wanted only ‘educated’ or ‘civilised’ black people to be allowed to vote, while yet others 





Cape liberalism was not ‘liberalism’ in the sense in which the term is used today. It was 
at best a conservative worldview leavened with a dash of Enlightenment humanism, which 
meant that it was more than mere tokenism. This is demonstrated by the 1853 Constitution 
which left Cape black people politically better off than other black people in the rest of South 
Africa. Davenport (1966) notes that many Cape white people considered themselves superior 
to black people, while Lewsen (1971: 65–80) comments that the Cape liberal tradition was ‘not 
universally accepted’ and Rich criticises what he refers to as a ‘static perception’ of Cape 
liberalism (1981: 33). What is clear, is that white people were divided over how to deal with 
black people in several spheres of Cape society and not just with regards the franchise, as a 
result of which Cape liberalism is now generally accepted to have a more complex meaning 
that previously thought. 
 
1.3. Representative and Responsible Government 
 
The British governed the Cape Colony from 1806. In 1834, a Legislative Council was formed 
to replace a weak Advisory Council which, since 1826, had advised the Governor who 
consistently side-lined it. The Legislative Council comprised the same members as the 
Advisory Council but had power to consent to laws introduced by the Governor (Macmillan: 
1936). It was widely resented by many colonists, who instead demanded a parliament that could 
reduce the unchecked authority of the Governor. The following decades saw many English 
colonists frequently petitioning for representative government. Constitution Ordinance No. 29 
(1852) established the Cape of Good Hope parliament and a Legislative Council of elected 
representatives. 
Between 1853 and 1891, in order to qualify for the franchise in the Cape Colony, a man 
was required to have occupied property valued at a minimum of £25 for at least 12 months, or 




accommodation). It has been argued that the Dutch only agreed to a low qualification franchise 
because it would give many of them the vote and thus a representative government to counter 
British political dominance (du Toit, 1987: 35–63; Giliomee, 1984: 1–10).  
The Cape Colony nearly split over the issue of self-government, but Britain would not 
consent to the split (Swiegers, 2014: 35). A faction in the eastern half of the colony opposed 
responsible government because they feared being dominated economically by the western 
faction which supported self-government (Swiegers, 2014: 35). The eastern faction also 
worried that the withdrawal of British troops would leave them defenceless. Responsible 
government was granted in 1872 after John Molteno’s Responsible Government Party 
successfully agitated for it. It shifted administrative authority from an appointed Governor to 
an elected prime minister who would appoint cabinet members who were accountable to 
parliament (Grundlingh, 1945: 43–7). Responsible government also gave the Cape Colony 
greater control over its finances and spending. 
 
1.4. Black political activity 
 
Low levels of black political activity from the introduction of the franchise in 1853 to the last 
quarter of the century can be attributed to a failure to meet voter requirements and a general 
lack of knowledge about the franchise (Imvo, 1988; Mills, 1985: 236). White candidates often 
bought black voter support in exchange for blankets (Roux, 1948: 54). Black people who 
adopted European ways were referred to as the school people, while red, blanket people 
referred to black people who maintained their traditional lifestyles and painted their bodies 
with red ochre (Davis, 1979).  
By the 1860s and ’70s black people increasingly desired an unprejudiced and impartial 
social order that would not discriminate on the basis of colour when opportunities to contribute 
to the formal economy became available (Odendaal, 1984: 3). Missionaries in the colony 




the day (Odendaal, 1984; Mills, 1976: 117). Black people saw missionary-driven Christianity 
as a way to attain ‘civilised’ status and education as a fundamental first step to progress (Mills, 
1976: 117). They generally believed that white racial prejudice was based on paranoia and that 
it would be reversed if white people encountered civilised black people. They therefore saw 
their engagement in political affairs as a necessary step to overturn unjust white legislation. 
Mills (1978: 54) notes that the optimism of the mission-educated black people was sadly 
misplaced as authorities soon took exception to the black vote.  
Educated isiXhosa young men were eager for information and in 1870, gladly welcomed 
the first widely disseminated publication that did not focus on religious issues. The paper was 
called Isigidimi sama-Xhosa and was printed at Lovedale College. It appeared in both English 
and isiXhosa and included articles that reflected on the economic and political issues of the day 
(Odendaal, 2012: 35). It was widely read and groups of individuals would meet to analyse and 
discuss the issues raised in its pages. John Tengo Jabavu, a prominent black writer, editor and 
activist, frequently wrote for the paper and in so doing, contributed to awakening black political 
consciousness. 
In the constituencies, the most politically engaged black leaders were elected into 
supervisory or advisory committees in order to represent and pursue the interests of white 
candidates. They would select a white candidate to support and communicate decisions to the 
rest of the politically conscious black electorate. By canvassing for votes, a second black 
committee would then help the white candidate to be elected to parliament (Trapido, 1968: 87).  
Jabavu saw it as essential to cultivate alliances with white politicians who would promote 
the black agenda, and he urged black voters to support liberal candidates (Odendaal, 2012: 35). 
He took over the editorship of Isigidimi in 1881 and soon clashed with missionaries and the 
publisher of the paper because of his strong convictions (Davenport, 2000: 111). His criticisms 




and to set up a new paper in 1884 called Imvo Zabatsundu (Odendaal, 2012: 104). Jabavu 
angered many white candidates who lost to candidates he publicly supported and he was 




From the 1860s onwards, Dutch candidates became increasingly frustrated with the non-racial 
Cape franchise because black people tended to support English candidates (Giliomee, 1984: 
5). In the 1884 elections, for example, Isigidimi ‘agents’ influenced the majority of the black 
voters of Victoria East to vote for English candidate James Rose-Innes (Odendaal, 2012: 99). 
As a result, the defeated candidate vowed to push for the removal of black voters from the 
voters’ rolls. Responsible government emboldened Cape parliamentarians to explore means for 
limiting the black franchise that were not colour-specific and therefore less likely to be vetoed 
by London.  
The Afrikaner Bond had long wanted to restrict the black franchise. In 1882, at meetings 
held in Graaff-Reinet (March) and Cradock (September), its members called for an increase in 
the property and income qualifications, for prospective voters to be obliged to take a reading 
test and for black communal tenure to be removed as a valid franchise qualification (Cape 
Argus, 1882). In the June 1884 parliamentary session, Bond members of parliament (MP) Mr 
Venter called for an increase in the franchise qualification and Mr Hofmeyr requested that the 
register be ‘improved and simplified’ (H.O.A, 1884: 231). The Afrikaner Bond, headed by Jan 
Hofmeyr, grew rapidly as a political power after merging with the Farmers’ Protection 
Association (Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging) in 1882 (Giliomee, 1987: 44). 
In an 1887 parliamentary session, Bond MP Le Roux reiterated the Bond’s request for a 
literacy test (H.O.A, 1887: 118). During the second reading of the Parliamentary Registration 
Bill, Cape premier Sir John Gordon Sprigg warned that between 1882 and 1886 black voter 




instance, black voter registration had increased from 14 percent to 51 percent of the total 
number of voter registrations in Victoria East and from 3.5 percent to 49 per cent in 
Wodehouse. 
 The Bill’s seventeenth clause removed communal tenure of land as a valid qualification 
for the franchise. Sprigg argued that this clause was meant to promote titled individual tenure 
of land which, he stated, had long been government policy and did not promote any hidden 
agenda. He further argued that allowing communal tenure as a qualification for the franchise 
actually contradicted the eighth clause of the Constitution Ordinance of 1853, which had 
introduced the income and property qualifications. According to Sprigg, if one took into 
account the value of the land held under tribal tenure and divided it by the number of black 
male adults living on the land, the value of individual holdings would not qualify any one of 
them for the vote (H.O.A, 1887: 70). The same Bill also introduced provisions that required a 
potential voter to have resided in a constituency for a period of 12 months in addition to which 
it also removed deceased voters from the rolls (H.O.A, 1887, 72). Sprigg later admitted that 
the Bill was intended to ‘purify’ the register (H.O.A, 1886: 95). Other parliamentarians, 
including future Cape Colony prime minister John X. Merriman, defended the black franchise, 
arguing that disenfranchisement legislation was intended to punish black people for electing 
English members ‘who did not agree with the government’ (H.O.A, 1887: 93–5, 100). 
There was a significant political response from black people to the threat of 
disenfranchisement posed by the Bill, which ‘was known by Africans as tung’ulomo (the 
sewing up of the mouth) (Odendaal, 2012: 114). When the news broke that the Bill had been 
passed, Jabavu increased his political awareness campaign. A conference held in King 
William’s Town in October 1887 to discuss the legislation was historic for bringing together a 
wide range of black organisations. The newly founded Native Vigilance Associations 




to encourage voter registrations (Odendaal, 2012: 112–28). They met frequently and submitted 
signed petitions to parliament in protest against the Bill. As secretary of the Associations, 
Jabavu led a small delegation that entreated the British Crown to veto the Act. In July 1887 the 
Registration Bill was passed into law after the Governor assented to it and became the first 
legislation to disenfranchise significant numbers of black voters (Odendaal, 2012: 195, 274). 
Lawyers acting on behalf of black voters managed to ensure that several hundred voters 
retained their franchise (Odendaal, 2012: 124). Other voters managed to convince registration 
officials that the value of their livestock and homesteads qualified them for the vote (Trapido, 
1968: 82). 
The incorporation of very large numbers of black people into the Cape over this period 
substantially changed the ratio of black to white inhabitants and resulted in white voters 
increasingly becoming worried about the possibility of being ‘swamped by barbarians,’ as Jan 
Hofmeyr claimed in 1891 (H.O.A, 1891: 95). Apart from the annexations, black voter numbers 
had also risen because the discovery of diamonds in 1867 and gold in 1884 raised both income 
and property values, thereby enabling more black people to meet the franchise qualification 
requirements (Mills, 2005).  
In August 1891, Hofmeyr tabled a motion that the franchise be amended on the basis of 
literacy or education, noting in the process that he was not the first to make such a suggestion 
since Bond MP De Smidt made similar pleas in 1869, 1872, 1880 and 1883 (H.O.A, 1891: 
327). Hofmeyr noted that over a six-year period the Transkei black population had risen from 
260,000 (in 1879) to 417,000 (in 1885). He also argued that if annexations of black territories 
continued, the black population would soon be “four or five times” the size of the white 
population.  
Under political pressure to remain in power Cecil John Rhodes, who desired to unite the 




Franchise and Ballot Bill of 1892 (Jenkins, 1951: 20; Thompson, 1960: 116). He decried the 
fact that black people were already the kind of force that could decide elections and wanted 
them to exercise the vote only once they had received adequate “political education” (Jenkins, 
1951: 21; Magubane, 1996: 108). For Rhodes, the Cape black franchise was a major 
complicating factor in his pursuit of union given that the Boer Republics resisted requests to 
allow for a black franchise in their territories (Fuller, 1910: 152; Walker, 1928: 438). 
In parliament, Hofmeyr maintained the Cape franchise would be the ‘great cause of 
separation’ in efforts to form a united South Africa (H.O.A, 1891: 329). The Afrikaner Bond 
tried to defend their support of the Franchise Bill, with MP Theron arguing the Bill was non-
racial and that it merely sought to prevent ‘illegal’ voters from exercising the franchise (H.O.A, 
1892: 178). Theron further stated that the Bond was ‘fighting’ a certain class of ‘native’ and 
quoted at length from an unnamed book written by an American on the ‘native question,’ 
reported on as follows by Hansard: 
[g]ood common sense and character were more to be desired in a Native than a smattering of schooling, 
which was often his ruin, causing him to eschew manual labour and take to preaching or laziness, 
imagining his little education made him equal to the best educated white man. To give him the franchise 
was dangerous and an exception was only made in the case of the truly industrious and wage-earning 
Natives, of whom there was no complaint to make (H.O.A, 1892: 178). 
The 1892 Act was an attempt to ‘fix’ what the 1887 law had failed to achieve (Trapido, 1968: 
55). It applied only to new voter registrations and previously registered voters were exempt 
from the law if they remained in their districts (H.O.A, 1892: 154). The requirements now 
included literacy (the ability to write one’s name, address and occupation) and raised the 
income qualification from £25 to £75. The new literacy and income requirements did not affect 
those who had registered before 1892 or those who had been employed as miners in Kimberley 
for six months preceding their registration (Trapido, 1968: 81). Rhodes and the Afrikaner Bond 




landholding qualification unchanged which qualified many white people for the vote (Fuller, 
1910: 207). 
1.6 Disagreements over numbers disenfranchised 
 
As mentioned earlier, Roux claimed in 1948 that 30,000 black voters were removed from the 
voters’ rolls through the 1887 Act and that ‘Ausi’ as well as Mbeki repeated this figure. Roux 
appears to be the first person to have quoted the figure but he does not explain how he arrived 
at it. He was a founding member or the Young Communist League in 1921 (a structure that 
opposed the white government of South Africa of the time), an active member of the 
Communist Party of South Africa from 1923 to 1936 and worked as political editor for the 
Communist newspaper, Umsebenzi, from 1930 to 1935. It is quite possible that his political 
views and political activities may have contributed to his inflating the number of 
disenfranchised black voters. Additionally, Roux, ‘Ausi’ and Mbeki all fail to mention the 
effect of the legislation on white voters. 
Although historians’ estimates of the number of disenfranchised black voters vary, they 
all appear to inflate the number by conflating the overall impact of the 1887 Act (the removal 
of c. 18,000 - 20,000 voters in total) with the impact on black voters which, I argue, was much 
lower. The situation is made worse by the fact that historians seem to perpetually refer to 
previously quoted figures instead of basing their analyses on actual research. Thus, as we shall 
see, Switzer and Stapleton quote figures used by Odendaal who, in turn, adopted figures used 
by Trapido and so on.  
McCracken states that the Registration Act of 1887 removed 24 percent of voters in the 
colony from the voters’ rolls with the total number of registrations falling from 80,924 (in 
1886) to 61,195 (in 1887) (McCracken, 1967: 92). While Hofmeyr was the first to quote these 
figures in an 1891 parliamentary session (H.O.A, 1891: 328) and while Trapido (1970: 133) 




McCracken distinguishes between the number of black and white voters disenfranchised by the 
legislation. Odendaal, too, estimates the number at 20,000 or ‘25 percent of the electorate,’ and 
states that most of those disenfranchised were black (Odendaal, 1984: 13; Odendaal, 2012: 
126); Switzer (1997: 62), citing Odendaal’s PhD thesis as his source, claims that the 1887 Act 
‘eliminated about 20,000 voters, most of whom were African’; Magubane (1996: 237), in his 
discussion of the Acts of 1887 and 1892, concludes that ‘the outcome of these changes was the 
elimination of 30,000 Africans from the voters’ rolls’ (it is unclear whether he attributes the 
number of disenfranchised black voters to one or both the Acts). Stapleton (2004) also restates 
the claim that the 1887 Act disenfranchised 20,000 black voters. 
Contradicting Hofmeyr’s numbers (80,924 voters in 1886 to 61,195 voters in 1887, i.e. a 
reduction of 19,729), the Statistical Register of the Cape Colony for 1887 records that 88,648 
voters were registered in 1886 and that the number fell to 70,305 in the following year. This 
means that there were 18,343 fewer voters after the introduction of the Registration Act of 1887 
– a number that is close to Trapido’s total of 20,000 and very far from Roux’s number of 30,000 
black voters. Simply subtracting 70,305 voters from a total of 88,648 does not in fact tell us 
how many voters were disenfranchised by the Act of 1887 since new voters may have 
registered during that year in addition to which the 18,343 may have included some voters who 
had died, moved to a different district or left the country. 
Williams and Elliot (1921: 207) claim that the 1892 Act reduced ‘non-European’ voters 
by 3,348 and increased European voters by 4,506 and attribute the numbers to the Statistical 
Registers. Roux (1948: 64), ‘Ausi’ (1956: 11), Jenkins (1951: 24) and McCracken (1967) all 
quote these same numbers while McCracken cites Hofmeyr’s biography (1913: 437) as his 
source. Rotberg (1988: 368) writes that “3,000 Africans, Coloureds and Asians were dropped” 
by the 1892 Franchise Act, not because of the higher qualification requirements but 




in other words, that the higher qualification requirements, including the literacy clause, had no 
effect at all. Even when no figures are provided, historians contribute to the exaggerated 
assessment of the legislation’s impact with generalised claims. Davenport (1991: 97), for 
instance, comments on the Acts of 1892 and 1894 that they ‘made severe inroads into the black 
electorate,’ without quantifying this judgement. It is also worth noting that claims about the 
number of disenfranchised do not distinguish between black people, coloured and Asians when 
they refer to ‘non-European’ voters. A more informative racial breakdown is provided later in 




Methodologically, I proceeded in two stages. In the first stage I transcribed the voter 
registrations of several eastern territories for the years 1886, 1887, 1889, 1891, 1893 and 1895. 
Because 1886 immediately preceded the implementation of the Act of 1887, I can compare the 
number of registered voters before and after the first disenfranchisement law. Similarly, I can 
compare the number of registered voters in 1891 to those for 1893 to evaluate the impact of the 
1892 Act. Shortage of funding and time limitations prevented me from transcribing the data 
from all the colony’s electoral divisions for the period under investigation. I excluded Cape 
Town and all the other western electoral divisions of the Cape Colony from the analysis, since 
the majority of black people resided in the eastern electoral divisions (Trapido, 1968: 80).  
The second stage consisted of identifying black voters in the voters’ rolls. From 1872 to 
1886 the Cape Colony voters’ rolls chronicled the first names, surnames and addresses of each 
registered voter. In 1887 the rolls began to capture the means by which the voter qualified to 
vote – that is, by virtue of income or property holding. Because race was not recorded before 
1903, I transcribed 53,000 records from the 1909 voters’ rolls which include both surname and 
racial classification, in effect providing me with a database of black surnames. Using this 




in the voters’ rolls of 1886, 1887, 1889, 1891, 1893 and 1895. The software isolates each 
surname and its corresponding racial classification from the 1909 rolls and searches for a match 
in the voters’ rolls of 1886, 1887, 1889, 1891, 1893 and 1895. By way of example, Figure 1.1 
below represents an extract from the voters’ roll of 1909 for the electoral division of 
Wodehouse in which a black voter named Sergeant Bekwa, a gaol guard, whose race is 
classified as ‘F’ which stands for ‘Mfengu’ (see no. 10 in Figure 1.1).6 
 
1.6.2 Counting black voters 
 
 
Using data from the Cape Colony Statistical Registers, Figure 1.2 shows the total number of 
voter registrations for all races in all the electoral divisions in the Cape Colony from 1886 to 
1909. While there is a substantial drop in total registrations between 1886 and 1887, the 
numbers indicate a clear recovery again by 1891. On the basis of data gathered in the second 
stage of research described above and with reference to the number of registered voters from 
the voters’ rolls (1886–95), I counted the number of black people in each electoral division 
over a period of several years. Table 1.1 shows the number of black voters that I successfully 
matched with the aid of the computing software. In interpreting these research results, the 
following two points should be borne in mind: firstly, that there are no voters’ rolls for 
Griqualand East and Thembuland for 1886 since these divisions had then only recently been 
annexed; secondly, that because data for some divisions (those that appear italicised in Table 
1.1) could not be transcribed (due to time and resource constraints), their voters were counted 
manually.  
                                                     





Figure 1.1. Wodehouse voters’ roll, 1909 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Changes in voter registrations, 1886–1909. 
Source: Cape Colony Statistical Registers, 1886–1909. 
 
My research confirmed that for the period 1886-1887, most electoral divisions indeed recorded 
a decline in the number of black voter registrations, with the greatest decline recorded in 
Wodehouse, where the number dropped by 85 percent. After implementation of the 1887 Act, 
the total number of black voters fell from 7,159 to 4,334, which means that the total number of 




of the black electorate) claimed by Roux, ‘Ausi’ and Mbeki.  
Given that the divisions I tallied represent regions with a majority of black people, it is 
highly unlikely that the total number of disenfranchised black voters would have been much 
larger. I therefore argue that the figure of 30,000, repeated uncritically over the years, is an 
exaggeration. The correct number is probably closer to 3,000. 
The table also shows that the Act of 1892 had the greatest impact in Fort Beaufort and 
Griqualand East and that the total number of black voters in the 15 divisions (16 including 
Kimberley) declined by just over 1,000. The figure of 3,348 non-Europeans said to have been 
disenfranchised by the Franchise Act of 1892 is reasonably accurate, given that there were 
many coloured people living in the western half of the Cape – divisions that I did not examine 
– who were likely to have been disenfranchised along with the roughly 1,000 black people 
calculated here (Williams and Elliot, 1921: 207). 
Table 1.1 Black voter registrations, 1886–95. 
 
Electoral division 1886 1887 1889 1891 1893 1895 
Aliwal North 670 299 300 473 463 458 
Cradock 185 27 103 32 27 8 
East London 16 117 36 30 25 34 
Fort Beaufort 437 144 174 658 288 300 
Graaff Reinet 48 3 6 8 2 4 
Grahamstown 81 41 15 38 39 48 
Griqualand East N/A 598 305 515 161 136 
Kimberley 175 50 77 88 144 144 
King William’s Town      1,183 903 862 1136 905 743 
Port Elizabeth 517 326 340 651 683 743 
Queenstown      1,665 950 825 887 855 788 
Somerset East 156 65 45 191 223 141 
Thembuland N/A 375 466 711 690 610 
Uitenhage 331 94 98 178 88 45 
Victoria East 461 158 165 229 223 205 
Wodehouse      1,234 184 434 601 580 560 
Total      7,159 4,334 4,281 6,426 5,396 4,967 
 
Source: Cape Colony voters’ rolls with authors’ calculations.  






Rotberg’s claim that the Act of 1892 was ineffective has merit. The South African Native 
Affairs Committee (1905: 139) asked if black people were being taught to read and write 
specifically to pass the literacy requirement introduced in the Franchise and Ballot Act of 1892 
and found that a ‘few’ black people had been so trained. The committee did not specify the 
exact number but it appears that such training had a positive effect on black voter numbers. 
 
   Table 1.2. White and coloured voter registrations, 1886–95 
Electoral division 1886 1887 1889 1891 1893 1895 
Aliwal North 816 779 837 1,076 1,130 1,060 
Cradock 2,051 1,583 1,609 1,957 2,101 2,028 
East London 1,593 1,141 1,177 1,561 1,939 1,856 
Fort Beaufort 1,385 1,095 1,148 832 1,123 1,019 
Graaff Reinet 2,985 1,972 1,887 2,130 2,196 2,132 
Grahamstown 2,194 1,282 1,277 1,616 1,662 1,475 
Griqualand East N/A 1,149 775 1,056 1,165 969 
Kimberley 6,037 3,733 4,376 5,582 4,322 4,385 
King William’s Town 2,149 1,380 2,013 2,315 2,169 2,158 
Port Elizabeth 5,242 3,489 3,322 4,448 4,857 4,821 
Queenstown 2,104 1,661 1,772 1,999 1,970 2,005 
Somerset East 1,748 1,685 1,600 2,379 2,315 2,299 
Thembuland N/A 1,106 963 1,100 1,181 1,297 
Uitenhage 4,670 3,237 3,443 4,322 4,172 4,418 
Victoria East 562 548 493 513 527 556 
Wodehouse 1,477 1,239 1,321 1,563 1,720 1,690 
Total 35,013 27,079 28,013 34,449 34,549 34,168 
Source: Cape Colony voters’ rolls with authors’ calculations. 
 
 
Lovedale College and the Isigidimi newspaper were located in Alice, about 64 kilometres 
from King William’s Town and 165 kilometres from Queenstown. This could have contributed 
to both King William’s Town and Queenstown having the highest level of black political 
activity of all the electoral divisions in the colony, as is evidenced by the size of the voter 
registrations in those two divisions. Thembuland, by comparison, had fewer black voter 
registrations over the period of study even though this division had the largest black population 
in the colony, which is probably due to the fact that Thembuland was annexed to the colony 
much later (1886) than King William’s Town and Queenstown (1848). It could also mean that 




that fewer would have qualified for the vote. 
 
1.6.3 Counting white and coloured voters 
 
In order to calculate white and coloured voters for each year by electoral division, I subtracted 
the black voters I had identified from the total number of voters who had registered. The results 
are shown in Table 1.2. As disenfranchisement targeted black rather than coloured voters, 
including coloured and white voters does not affect my argument in this chapter (i.e. the lower 
than expected number of black voters who were disenfranchised). I found more disenfranchised 
white people and coloureds than expected. Many white and coloured voters were removed from 
the voters’ rolls after the Act of 1887. The number of registered white and coloured voters fell 
from 35,013 in 1886 to 27,079 in 1887, a difference of 7,934. It is likely that a large section of 
this number comprises voters who were disenfranchised by the Act of 1887, even when the 
effects of natural attrition and migration have been taken into consideration. 
The Act of 1892 had no substantial effect on white and coloured voters, probably because 
their income, property and literacy levels were higher than those of black voters. The total 
number of white and coloured voters are roughly the same, as the 1893 voters’ rolls show an 
increase of only 100 voters following the implementation of the Act of 1892. It is not 
impossible to separate white people from coloured voters, but that is beyond the scope of this 
study.  
1.7 Implications and Conclusions 
 
Micro-level data and technological advances mean that we can now exploit archives more 
efficiently (Fourie, 2016). The voters’ rolls and the methods I applied to analysing them make 
it possible for us to reinterpret a long accepted aspect of black political, social and economic 
history. I found that fewer than 3,000 black people were disenfranchised by the Act of 1887. 
This number is much smaller than the 30,000 black people that several authors claim to have 





Firstly, it is clear that black voters were not simply the passive victims they were 
previously imagined to have been (a story well told by Odendaal, 2012: 112-28). Attempts by 
colonial politicians to disenfranchise black voters were widely resisted. As can be seen from 
the evidence presented here, black people responded to this legislation in a variety of ways: 
with political activism; by recruiting more qualifying black men to vote; by attaining literacy 
specifically for the purpose of accessing the franchise and by pursuing the very education that 
was being used to prevent them from voting. Importantly, my estimates of black voter numbers 
reveal that black resistance to disenfranchisement was much more effective, and the legislation 
much less effective, than existing literature claims.  
Secondly, I note that both white and coloured voters were also affected by the Act of 
1887. This seems counter-intuitive, particularly in the case of white people, since the Act 
targeted communal ownership of land and white voters were largely private landowners. The 
reason for this reduction in white and coloured voter numbers is unclear. It may be that, because 
of the recession experienced in the Cape Colony in the mid-1880s, white and coloured voters’ 
incomes declined, pushing them below the minimum level for the franchise qualification 
(Mabin, 1986: 275–303). Future research could explore reasons to explain these declining voter 
registration numbers.  
Thirdly, Colin Bundy’s account of ‘the emergence and decline of a South African  
```````peasantry’ in the last decades of the nineteenth century may go some way to explaining 
black resistance to disenfranchisement legislation (Bundy, 1972: 369–88). Most black people 
on the voters’ rolls were engaged in some form of agricultural activity (as we can see from the 
voters’ rolls from 1903 onwards where a voter’s occupation or trade is also listed). Black people 
were more prosperous than may have been previously imagined, as they enjoyed the benefits 




the franchise was closely related to the defence of the peasantry.’ The Act of 1892, which 
increased the minimum income and literacy requirement, scarcely affected black people since 
many of them met the new qualifications. That the 1892 Act only applied to new registrations, 
excluding those who were already on the rolls, may also help to explain the low numbers of 
Africans who were disenfranchised. 
In the fourth instance, the large number of white people who were disenfranchised by the 
Act of 1887 may be attributed to what would later be called the ‘poor white problem.’ The 
Afrikaner Bond in the early 1880s and the Dutch Reformed Church Conference in 1886 
highlighted this phenomenon of mainly rural white people struggling to make a living because 
they tended to have low levels of education (Fourie, 2007: 1270–96). Many white farmers were 
struggling to adapt to a changing economy that required innovative techniques while previously 
abundant land was becoming scarce (Giliomee, 1992). Losing their access to land may have 
led to the inability of impoverished white people to register for the franchise since they would 
not have met the property qualification (Bundy, 1968: 108-12).  
Raising the 1892 franchise qualification from £25 to £75 and introducing the literacy 
requirement inadvertently exposed lower income white people to legislation that was intended 
for black people. This had severe economic consequences for black people; the Afrikaner Bond 
advocated an improved and eventually compulsory education for white children after 
supporting Rhodes’s government in the 1890s, while black schooling was underfunded (Duff, 
2011a: 261–82). Therefore, although, as my numbers show, disenfranchisement legislation was 
not very effective in directly reducing black voter numbers, it had the indirect effect in later 










CHAPTER TWO: DISTRICT COUNCILS AND BLACK 




One important feature of the 1880s and ’90s democratic reversal was that the Cape government 
established the Transkeian Territories District Councils (DCs) as a means of compensating 
black people for the franchise restrictions introduced by the Glen Grey Act of 1894 (Walker, 
1925: 256; Hammond-Tooke, 1968: 460). These councils were to ensure that black people 
focused on local politics and to reduce their participation in national elections (Stoch, 1984: 
17). As this chapter will show, DCs were also very important for the development of black 
education in the Transkei between 1893 and 1909.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, from the mid-1800s Cape politicians expressed the 
desire to be relieved of the ‘burden’ of governing the large tracts of lands that had been annexed 
and the DCs allowed them to do so (Thompson, 1991). The Cape government wanted black 
people to pay for their own education with the result that white educational administrators 
recommended compulsory taxation for education in all the black territories as well as the 
extension of the Transkeian Councils to several districts (SCONE, 1908: 28). Former Cape 
Prime Minister Spriggs emphasised the fact that the Cape Colony was paying much more for 
the upkeep of black districts than these districts were contributing to their own economic 
development through taxation (Kenyon, 1939: 32).  
DCs also gave black people partial administrative authority over their territories in the 
Transkei, Thembuland and Pondoland (Brownlee, 1937: 346). These councils were an early 
attempt at separate development and black self-governance and served as a tool for adapting 
black social and political norms (Brookes, 1927: 114). 
Several influential individuals believed that the creation of DCs in the 1890s had led to 




three observations seem relevant. Firstly, Sir Walter Stanford, former Chief Magistrate of the 
Transkei, observed that in 1893 Rhodes stressed to missionaries that teacher salaries would 
increase if the missionaries accepted the provision the Glen Grey Act made for DCs (Stanford, 
1962: 166-7). Rhodes furthermore stated to headmen that their children would receive better-
quality education (Stanford, 1962: 166-7). Secondly, several respondents at the Parliamentary 
Select Committee on Native Education (1908) claimed that rising enrolment and attendance 
figures was a sign of the DCs’ success (SCONE, 1908). Finally, Fuller (1910: 178) claims that 
the Glen Grey Act was successful as Rhodes had projected that DCs would build new schools 
and improve education in their districts. Fuller further states that DC schools were performing 
better than some white schools. 
This chapter aims to empirically test the claim that the rising enrolment and attendance 
figures of black schoolchildren were consequences of the introduction of the Transkei DCs. 
The literature on the Glen Grey Act has largely ignored Rhodes’ objective of improving certain 
aspects of black schooling. I am unaware of any author who has investigated that objective and 
its outcome. Additionally, there are few works on the Transkei DCs for the period under 
investigation here. One example is Hammond-Tooke (1968) who evaluates the councils’ 
conception, aims and objectives and who concludes that the council system was unsuccessful 
in making a significant contribution to the socio-economic development of the Transkeian 
Territories. The methods used by Hammond-Tooke, however, do not allow for causal analysis. 
Kerr (1976: 359) proposes that the standard for evaluating policy effectiveness should be 
whether the policy (or legislation) in question accomplished the purpose it set out to achieve, 
which is what I seek to do with regard to DCs in relation to education in the Transkei.  
This chapter is in the first instance a contribution to the economic history literature 
focused on the growth and development of education in the Cape Colony and the history of 




Frankema, 2012; Woodberry, 2012). I briefly summarise some of the major contributions to 
this literature next. Davis (1969) describes the growth of black education and the challenges 
that black people endured in their pursuit of schooling; Paterson (1992) highlights the important 
role that missionaries and independent African churches played in the provision of black 
education, while Duff (2011b) explains how the Cape government improved white education 
in an attempt to address white poverty while marginalising black education.  
While this literature provides insights into the development of black schooling, little 
attention has been paid to education outcomes as affected by DCs in the Transkei and no 
analysis has focus ed on political reasons for the provision of education in DCs.  
It is my contention that the literature on colonial education has largely ignored black 
agency in the provision of education (exceptions being Cogneau and Moradi, 2014; Meier zu 
Selhausen, 2019). I highlight this agency by demonstrating how black people took it upon 
themselves to ensure that their children enrolled and attended schools in the Transkei. My work 
also supports Frankema (2012) who claims that the role of British colonialism in improving 
education outcomes has been overstated. He found that variation in enrolment rates in both 
British and European colonies can be explained by the selective location of mission stations 
and their acceptance by black people. Maxwell (2016) critiques the tendency to attribute mass 
African education solely to white missionary efforts, because it ignores the role played by black 
missionaries and black teachers in funding schools and paying for the education of millions.  
In the second instance, this chapter contributes to the literature on the political economy 
of colonial education (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008; Bryant, 2018). Education has always 
been an important means of exclusion in severely unequal societies (Sokoloff and Engerman, 
2002; Mncube and Harber, 2012). In the USA, for instance, the ‘common school movement,’ 
which demanded, ‘free’ public schooling for all began in the 1830s and transformed American 




the broader cry for democratisation from large parts of the population at the time. The franchise 
was extended just before the introduction of public schools that were funded by local property 
taxes, which demonstrates the impact democratisation had on education in the U.S. (Sokoloff 
et al. 2002: 908). 
Democratisation has been shown to precede mass education reforms and income 
redistribution – for example, by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) in reference to several 
European countries and Acemoglu et. al (2014) for Latin America.7 In this chapter I argue the 
opposite, namely that democratic reversal occurred just prior to the expansion of education in 
the Transkei. My work is also related to Paglayan (2020) who studies education access across 
many autocratic and democratic political systems with data that covers 200 years. Paglayan did 
not find any evidence of a relationship between democratisation and enrolment. 
In the third instance, this chapter also adds to the literature on local government that 
focuses specifically on the decentralisation of fiscal and education administration.8 The 
empirical findings presented in this chapter support the Tiebout (1956) hypothesis: DCs 
encouraged decentralised local governmental decision-making through the exercise of fiscal 
and administrative powers (Pal and Wahhaj, 2017). Similar to Bartolini et al. (2016) and 
Lakomaa and Wahlund (2019), I show the advantages decentralisation had for increasing the 
efficiency of local resource allocation. Such decentralisation has not received much attention 
                                                     
7 Many studies have linked democratisation to education with most finding that the former precedes the latter. For 
overviews of this literature see Lindert (2004) and Gift and Wibbels (2014). Harding and Stasavage (2014) is also 
important as it illustrates how education can be manipulated in a democracy. The authors show how Kenyan 
politicians requested votes in exchange for no-fee schools. There are far fewer studies that question the 
relationship between democratisation and education. For example, Dahlum and Knutsen (2017) study 
international student outcomes for 128 countries over the period 1965 to 2010 and show that democratisation is 
associated with increased quantity, but not quality, of schooling.  
8 In a seminal article, Tiebout (1956) contends that, due to individual choice of where to live, improved local 
government resource allocation could accurately mirror local preferences, tastes and demand for goods and 
services. This ‘sorting’ (or migration) theory, however, does not always align with reality because evidence of the 
benefits of decentralisation for service delivery has been mixed. For example, Caselli and Michaels (2013) found 
that despite greater expenditure on education and health by Brazilian municipalities, outcomes in these sectors did 
not improve. Similarly, Kim (2019) argues that inadequate skills and capacity deficiencies of bureaucrats limit 




in scholarship on Africa.  
An important contribution to this literature related to Africa is from Acemoglu et al. 
(2014) who found a negative correlation between the presence of the traditional chiefs’ 
institution and primary and secondary school outcomes in Sierra Leone. They also speculate 
that traditional chiefs (who had the authority to raise taxes) may have diverted funds intended 
for education and may also intentionally have sabotaged schooling in order to reduce the 
likelihood of educated subjects challenging their rule. My findings suggest the opposite, i.e. a 
positive correlation between the DC institution and education outcomes. My results also reveal 
the need for more empirical work to be done on the political economy of colonial education 
outcomes. 
2.2. Black education in the Cape Colony prior to the Union 
 
The creation of a formal education system in the Cape Colony arguably began with the 
establishment of a Department of Education and the appointment of the first Superintendent 
General of Education in 1839. The push specifically for black education only came about 
fifteen years later, particularly from Governor Sir George Grey. Education was considered vital 
for the subjugation of the native population and border pacification and under the Grey Plan 
£55,046 was spent on black education (primarily offered by missions) between 1855 and 1863. 
However, this funding of black education did not last. The Education Commission of 1863 
recommended different categories of schools (Molete, 1995: 48), as indicated in Table 2.1. 
Aborigine or Order C schools were the only segregated institutions exclusively reserved for 
black children. They were located in the Transkei, Griqualand East and Pondoland and 
typically provided elementary education only.  








  Table 2.1: Types of schools in the Cape 
School order     Location of schools 
ORDER A  1st Class    Main towns 
 2nd Class    Towns & villages 
 3rd Class    Farms 
ORDER B Mission schools    Urban and rural 
ORDER C Aborigines    Native territories 
ORDER D District boarding schools    Farms 
   Source: Cape Education Act, No. 13 of 1865. Cited in Molete (1995: 48). 
In his review of nineteenth century black education, Davis (1969) argues that an 
important shift in the Cape’s educational policy took place after 1864. With an expansion in 
black education as a result of the additional territorial annexation that brought the Ciskei into 
the colony and a lack of resources amongst missionaries and black people themselves, came an 
increased dependency on colonial financing of black education. In addition, starting in 1863, 
the government began to focus on white education and from the late 1880s major policy 
changes in education followed increasingly vocal criticism of black education by white people.  
Table 2.2 shows the rapid expansion of black education between 1890 and 1910, with 
enrolment and attendance figures increasing almost fourfold over the period. This, despite the 
fact that between 1895 and 1910 white schools received substantially more funding than black 
schools. Beginning from a relatively similar base in 1880, the allocation to white education 
increased by a factor of 12 over the period 1895-1915 (£50,131 to £652,110), compared with 
an increase in the allocation to black education by only a factor of three (£34,972 to £144,738) 
(Paterson, 1992: 72).   
Black primary school attendance continued to grow as white hostility increased. In her 
account of black educational policy from 1652 to 1948, Babb-Bracey (1984) argues that the 
various governments of the Cape Colony made decisions relating to black education based on 
ideologies of white superiority and their accompanying political and economic agendas, with 




was prioritised. Although overt racist thinking was already evident among educational 
stakeholders, active segregation only became common from 1891 onwards.  
Table 2.2: The growth of black education in Order C schools 
Year Number of schools Enrolment Attendance 
    
1890 256 14718 11318 
1895 337 19483 13590 
1900 547 39028 29615 
1905 701 44843 35855 
1910 846 51850 42826 
         Source: Loram (1917: 53) 
 
Black enrolment over the period 1890 to 1910 grew at a significantly faster pace than 
white enrolment with the expansion of black schooling occurring almost exclusively in the 
Transkeian regions (Paterson, 1992: 68-70). Black school attendance in the Transkei increased 
despite rising conflict between the educational interests of white and black people. This can be 
explained by the fact that there was less vocal opposition to black education given that there 
were fewer white residents in the Transkei than in other parts of the Colony (Paterson, 1992: 
70). Paterson (1992: 84-86) further emphasises that, although enrolment figures increased in 
the Transkei, black attendance was erratic owing to their engagement in traditional ceremonies 
and agricultural labour as well as the contagious diseases that plagued the region at different 
times. 
The discovery of gold and diamonds in the late nineteenth century spurred 
industrialisation which in turn motivated urbanisation and a growth in migrant labour. That 
said, the increase in black schooling numbers did not originally stem from industrial demand 
for skilled labour since most skills required on farms and mines could be learnt on the job. 
Rather, land appropriation, drought and rinderpest in the late 1890s meant that education was 
increasingly being seen as a means of acquiring or securing work other than agricultural labour. 




acquire educational qualifications in order to qualify for the vote and better defend black 
political rights (Paterson, 1992: 65). Babb-Bracey (1984) specifically highlights the various 
ways in which black people pushed back and adapted to ‘cultural imperialism’ as they conceded 
that white education was important not only for their own economic prospects but also for their 
political freedom from oppression.  
 
2.2.1 Mission schools 
 
Colonial economic and political expansion was tied to christian evangelisation and educational 
provisions carried out by missionaries (Neill, 1966: 35-39). Despite the liberal humanist 
notions associated with Protestantism, attitudes of Christian and racial superiority as well as 
the need for acculturation to western norms and values extended to the education provided and 
pedagogies adopted by missionaries (Du Plessis, 1911; Behr, 1963; Gray, 1990: 59). For 
example, some mission schools presented lessons on the virtue of public sobriety and how to 
build western-style houses (Fourie and Swanepoel, 2015: 8). In the context of decisive changes 
in colonial notions of what constituted a ‘good’ black education, missionaries increasingly 
adopted an industrial education model which, although still aligned with their aim of converting 
black people to Christianity, increasingly aimed at improving the manual labour skills and work 
capacity of black people (Paterson, 1992: 106).  
The collusion between missionaries and colonial government emerged most clearly from 
the second half of the nineteenth century onwards. Missions had limited material resources at 
their disposal and requested financial assistance from government. Cook (1934), for example, 
discusses the history of black education in the largely neglected Elliotdate district between 
1885 and 1929 where missionary education emerged with very little government funding.9 
                                                     
9 A study closely related to Cook’s is that of Van Dyk (1964) who studied the education of the Griqua and Bantu 
people in Griqualand East. His is a good account of the development of their educational system, detailing the 
development of missionaries becoming less active in the provision of education in the region as government aid 





Arguments in favour of black funding of education, particularly the wages of black teachers in 
mission schools, were frequently made. Due to the poverty of many of these regions, however, 
parents could not afford to cover tuition fees.  
Over time the increased financial dependency of missions brought missionary education 
increasingly under the political and social control of government, a development particularly 
despised by black independent churches (Etherington, 1982: 193-194; Paterson, 1992). The 
social and political influence of government funding was most acutely felt in the curriculum: 
where once mission education had reflected a classic curriculum, focus shifted dramatically 
towards industrial education and training. This was aimed at providing “a docile and efficient 
labour force which would accept both white religions and political authority, as well as white 
social superiority” (De Kock, 1996: 70-71). As discussed earlier, mission schools eventually 
succumbed to segregated schooling despite some resistance by a number of clergy. 
Discussions of the expansion of black education, however, have largely ignored the 
growth in educational provision driven by black initiatives through independent black churches 
(Brownlee, 1937: 341; Paterson, 1992: 57). Independent black mission institutions emerged in 
response to increased segregation, lower spending on black (mission) schooling and a lack of 
community control in schools. Brock (1974), for example, notes the Mfengu’s determination 
to ensure greater educational provision for their people in addition to both urban and rural black 
communities being vocal about a range of educational needs that were not being met by mission 
schools. Although missionaries and the school inspectorate were concerned about the 
establishment of these “independent” church schools by black people, there was not much the 
Education Department could do to interfere (Paterson, 1992: 133). One example of an 
independent church establishing schools was the black Presbytarian Church (APC) which was 
formed in 1898 as a breakaway from the United Free Church of Scotland. Although the 




in the Victoria East region, its reach eventually extended beyond the borders of that region so 
that by the beginning of 1903 the APC reportedly controlled forty schools with a total of 2,024 
enrolees.  
 
2.2.2 The Glen Grey Act and DCs 
 
In 1894, Rhodes pushed for approval of the Glen Grey Act after “extensive consultations” with 
Hofmeyer (Rotberg, 1988: 469). Rhodes wanted to use the Act’s provisions to draw labour 
from the Transkei and Griqualand East for work in the mining industry, manufacturing and on 
farms in the western half of the Cape (Thompson, 1991; Rotberg, 1988: 470-71). The Act 
stipulated that DCs were to consist of 12 black representatives, six of whom were to be 
appointed by the Governor-general and six elected by black people (Ntsebeza, 2005: 66). DCs 
were created so that, as Rhodes put it, black people would “employ their minds on simple 
questions in connection with local affairs” (cited in Tabata 1950: 106) and not on parliamentary 
issues.  
Black men in the Glen Grey district paid a tax if they did not own land allotments and 
had not worked outside Glen Grey for a certain period each year. DCs charged each adult male 
a tax of ten shillings per annum, multiplied by the number of wives he had (Beinart, 1982: 43) 
and spent funds raised on the development of roads and other public infrastructure as well as 
schooling (Blue Book on Native Affairs, 1885; Brownlee, 1923: vi; Brookes, 1927: 254). 
Under the chairmanship and guidance of the Chief Magistrate at Umtata, the Transkeian 
Territories General Council in 1903 became the umbrella body for all the DCs (Hammond-
Tooke, 1968: 457; Ntsebeza, 2005: 95). Magistrates of the different districts as well as several 
Black councillors from the districts had positions on the General Council’s board (Cape Native 
Blue Book, 1896: 93-4). This council transferred funds to individual districts and gave grants 
to mainly government-aided schools intended to supplement expenditure on teachers’ salaries 




2.2.3 Support for DCs: Select Committee on Native Education 
The Report of the Select Committee on Native Education of 1908 published interviews that 
were conducted with several influential men in the Cape educational sector including the 
principals of top schools, overseers and the Superintendent General of Education. When asked 
about school attendance, most of the respondents claimed that the improved attendance in 
Transkeian schools was due to the Glen Grey Act and the DCs (SCONE, 1908: 110, 213). They 
stated that it would have been very difficult to collect fees without the Glen Grey Act and 
argued for the Act’s expansion, though not in its entirety since black people had rejected several 
of its clauses. Reverend Sihlali, Chief Missionary Superintendent of ten schools in Engcobo, 
St Mark’s, Nqamakwe, Thembuland and Xalanga (four districts in Mfenguland) advocated for 
the council system, stating that “Council schools were more effective than non-Council 
schools” (SCONE, 1908: 110). This was because council schools could better attract teachers 
since their salaries had a better chance of being paid which he believed to be a result of the fact 
that councils contributed financially to the running of the schools. Council schools also had a 
committee that assisted teachers which in turn led to higher attendance. Sihlali highlighted the 
fact that Mfenguland had very good attendance (SCONE, 1908: 110). Parents in DCs 
contributed financially to a fund that supplemented government school grants while schools 
outside the council system had difficulty collecting fees and generally had less revenue than 
those in DCs (SCONE, 1908: 112).  
Dr Rubusana oversaw sixteen schools in East London, Stutterheim and King William’s 
Town (all Ciskei towns) and supported the council system in districts which he was responsible 
for since it assisted with the collection of school fees (SCONE, 1908: 212). He also called for 
a tax similar to what existed in several Transkei districts for the purpose of funding education. 
The magistrate of Kentani, Mr Thompson, similarly claimed that the Transkeian councils had 




schools to the council. He gave evidence that black people were paying towards their own 
education (SCONE, 1908: 68). Mr Thompson also agreed with Mr Schreiner that the Mfengu 
had become educated at a faster rate than other groups which had come under control of the 
Cape authorities at a later stage (SCONE, 1908: 87). Mr McClaren, education inspector for 
Butterworth, Nqamakwe and Tsomo, also encouraged the adoption of the council system, 
saying that teachers received higher pay and that the system encouraged parents to take a 
greater interest in the education of their children.  
 
2.2.4 Determining whether or not a district got Council status 
 
Despite these favourable reports black residents of the Transkei generally resisted DCs, 
especially during the early years of implementation (Brookes, 1927: 115). The first councils 
were nevertheless set up in Glen Grey locations and expanded across the Kei River to 
Butterworth, Idutywa, Nqamakwe and Tsomo (Mfenguland) in late 1894. Kentani received the 
council system in 1899 with more districts in Thembuland and East Griqualand receiving 
councils in 1903 (Cape Native Blue Book, 1899: 72, 81; Brookes, 1927: 114). 
 The 1891 census provides racial classifications for all the Transkei districts and shows 
that the four early adopters of district councils had the largest numbers of Mfengu people in 
the Transkei. This fact is important because the Mfengu had developed close ties with the 
colonial government from the 1860s onwards. In the secondary literature an explanation is 
offered for why the above-named districts received council status in 1895. In a dissertation on 
the history of the Thembu people, Wagenaar (1988: 318) claims that the Mfengu were more 
willing than the Thembu to accept the Glen Grey Act’s land tenure provisions. Magistrates 
falsely claimed that (all) black people had agreed to the Glen Grey Act’s provisions when in 
fact they were frustrated by how land was being governed and allocated under traditional chiefs 
and the headmen and the government wanted to destroy tribal society. Ally (1985: 126-146) 




Act’s implementation and twisted the views of black people who strongly opposed the Act. 
Based on the available evidence, I argue that the colonial government decided to pilot DCs in 
the four Mfengu districts because they believed that DCs would be more readily accepted by 
the local inhabitants. That said, I also examine other possible reasons for the DCs’ being piloted 
in the four Mfengu districts. 
Figure 2.1 below is a map that shows where the Transkei districts were located in the 
Cape Colony and Table 2.3 lists the year in which a district received a council. Twelve districts 
did not get councils before 1909 while Butterworth, Idutywa, Kentani and Nqamakwe were 
early adopters, all receiving councils prior to 1900. A possible criticism of my empirical 
approach could be that the four above-named districts already had a higher demand for 
education and higher levels of literacy than other districts and that this may explain their early 
adoption of councils. The 1891 Cape Colony census provides literacy (reading and writing) 
and population information on 21 of the 27 Transkei districts whose populations were mainly 
black. These are listed in Table 2.3 below. In 1891 the proportion of literate people in 
Butterworth and Nqamakwe was about nine percent while Maclear, Mount Currie and Xalanga 
had proportions of literacy exceeding 20 percent without having adopted council status during 
the period of study. One can therefore not argue that high literacy contributed to the early 






Figure 2.1: Map of Transkei, 1895 - Eastern Cape 
Source: Visagie and Bergh (1985: 65) 
 
 
Table 2.3: DCs and non-DCs  
District Council District Council 
Bizana No Council Mt Frere No Council 
Butterworth 1895 Mqanduli 1903 
Elliot  No Council Ngqeleni No Council 
Elliotdale 1903 Ntabankulu No Council 





Idutywa 1895 St Mark 1903 
Kentani 1899 Tsolo 1903 
Libode No Council Tsomo 1895 
Maclear No Council Umsikaba No Council 
Matatiele No Council Umtata 1903 
Mt Ayliff No Council Willowvale 1903 
Mt Currie No Council Xalanga No Council 
Mt Fletcher 1903 Umzimkulu 1903 
Nqamakwe 1895   




An important consideration is whether the urbanisation status of districts played a significant 
role in the establishment of councils. Urbanisation means that more people live closer to 
schools and so should cause an increase in enrolment. Theoretically, urbanisation would also 
drive the building of new schools. For reasons discussed below, urbanisation however seemed 
to have played no part in determining whether or not a district received council status in 1895. 
There are several reasons for this. Firstly, the Cape Colony census (1891: 470) shows that East 
Griqualand, Tembuland and Transkei (ETT) had four steam engines among them while East 
London had 48, Port Elizabeth, 121 and Cape Town, 487. The main industries in the colony 
were breweries, tobacco, soap, brickyards, tanneries and potteries. East Griqualand, 
Tembuland and Transkei had none of these industries while Cape Town, East London and Port 
Elizabeth had several hundred. In 1892 ETT were very rural areas, with over two-thirds of their 
populations employed in agriculture, as is shown in Table 2.4 below. The Cape Parliamentary 
debates (1887 to 1897) and secondary literature (e.g. Bundy, 1972 and Ntsebeza, 2005) always 
refer to ETT as rural areas. Another indicator of urbanisation is the establishment of railways 
and in 1895 there were none in ETT.  
 
Table 2.4: Percentage of population employed in different sectors, 1904 























Maclear 1.8 7.14 1.54 45.11 .  
Matatiele 0.58 1.89 0.65 62.92 1.11 
Mount Ayliff 0.5 0.6 0.17 72.07 0.56 
Mount Currie 2.14 9.77 1.67 46.06 6.9 
Mount Fletcher 0.37 0.49 0.17 65.73 0.35 
Mount Frere 0.64 0.83 0.19 60.38 0.44 
Qumbu 0.45 0.51 0.19 64.24 0.39 
Tsolo 0.41 0.64 0.2 66.06 0.59 
Umzimkhulu 0.63 1.24 0.36 68.18 1.07 
Elliot 1.08 7.65 1.3 39.76 13.56 
Elliotdale 0.2 0.42 0.21 75.44 0.21 
Engcobo 0.29 0.48 0.15 67.46 0.3 
Mqanduli 0.28 0.37 0.11 72.7 0.22 
St. Mark's 0.25 0.62 0.23 67.27 . 9 
Umtata 1.34 2.07 0.56 66.19 81
Xalanga 1.05 3.68 0.84 55 1 25




Bizana 0.24 0.19 0.16 71.34 0.48 
Flagstaff 0.22 0.37 0.23 73.6 0.32 
Libode 0.2 0.41 0.19 73.89 0.22 
Lusikisiki 0.27 0.38 0.14 73.21 0.42 
Ngqeleni 0.3 0.5 0.21 71.28 0.21 
Port St John 0.57 1.77 0.83 71.01 1.39 




Note: own calculations using data from the Cape Colony Censuses (1891 and 1904). 
 
2.3 Data description  
 
In this study, annual summary statistics on education in the Transkei and the Cape Colony 
provided in the Blue Books were recorded for different categories of schools located in each 
census division. The number of black students (enrolment and attendance) for 27 districts for 
the period 1893 to 1909 was derived from Aborigine school data in the Superintendent of 
Education’s annual reports.10 Mission schools that accommodated all races and therefore taught 
black children were excluded from the analysis in this chapter since it is impossible to separate 
the number of white children from black children. It is highly unlikely that the exclusion of 
these mission schools affected the final results since by 1910 all but a few of them had become 
fully racially segregated.  
 From 1896 to 1899, the Blue Books combined the districts of Lusikisiki and Flagstaff 
under the name ‘Umsikaba’ but listed them separately from 1900 onwards. In this study I 
combined the districts as ‘Umsikaba’ for the period 1900-1909. Additionally, some districts in 
Pondoland do not have educational data for 1893 and 1894 since they were only annexed to 






                                                     
10 Before 1893 the Blue Books did not record Transkeian attendance or enrolment by district. Instead, they simply 
listed each school without specifying to which district it belonged. The reports include white (public Order A) 




2.3.1 Methodology: Difference-in-difference estimator 
 
The difference-in-difference (DID) method is an empirical technique that can be used to 
measure the causal effects or impact of policy changes on different groups (Lechner, 2010: 
167). DID is particularly suitable when it is not possible to control certain confounding factors 
or to make use of instrumental variables due to data unavailability (McNamee, 2005: 501). A 
successful DID identification strategy requires the existence of two main groups (Pischke, 
2005): a treated group (affected by the policy change) and a control group (unaffected by the 
policy change). The DID estimator measures the difference in mean outcomes of the treated 
group, pre- and post-treatment, minus the difference in mean outcomes in the control group, 
pre- and post-treatment (Wooldridge, 2012: 3). Furthermore, pre- and post-treatment groups 
should be observed within both the treatment and control groups (Fricke, 2017), allowing for 
external trends in the outcome that could be correlated with the treatment to be separated from 
the treatment impact. This implies estimation as per the following equation:  
 𝑌𝑑𝑡 = 𝛾𝑑 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝛽
′𝐷𝐶𝑑 ∗ 𝑇𝑡 + 𝛿𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑑 + 𝑑𝑡   [1] 
where Y represents black enrolment (attendance) within district d in year t, 𝛾𝑑 and 𝜆𝑡 are fixed 
effects for district and time, respectively, POP is a continuous variable representing population 
growth in a district, and dt represents a normally distributed random error with zero mean. 
𝐷𝐶 is a dummy variable equal to one if the district represents one that received a council 
(treated group) and zero otherwise (control group). 𝑇𝑡 represents time dummies such that 𝜆 
captures any time trends that are common to both district groups. The coefficient 𝛽  therefore 
represents the impact on black enrolment and attendance figures of receiving a council. 
As already indicated in Table 2.4 above, however, the establishment of DCs 
corresponded to three treatment phases, namely 1895, 1899 and 1903. Therefore, DCs will not 
have an immediate but rather a staggered effect on attendance and enrolment. Many periods, 




𝑌𝑑𝑡 = 𝛾𝑑 + 𝜆𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐷𝐶𝑡+𝑗 + 𝛿𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑑𝑡 + 𝑑𝑡
𝑞
𝑗=−𝑚     [2] 
with Y, POP and 𝑑𝑡 as defined above. The parameter of interest is now 𝛽𝑗 on DC, which 
represents whether treatment (receiving a DC) was switched on in year t, with q representing 
leads and m lags of the treatment. The most critical identifying assumption of DID is that of 
parallel trends, which require that both treated and control groups maintain their movement 
paths as if no intervention has occurred (Mora and Reggio, 2017). A test of this assumption 
would be that 𝛽𝑗 = 0 for all j < 0 (zero coefficients on leads) and that 𝛽𝑗 for j ≥ 0 may not be 
identical (treatment accrues over time). Figures 2.2 and 2.3 below show aggregated district 
enrolment and attendance trends for black schools between 1893 and 1909 according to DC 
status. In line with discussions in earlier sections of this chapter, the general rise in black 
enrolment and attendance figures between 1890 and 1910 is clear. Furthermore, schooling 
outcomes show similar trends for treated (DC) and control (non-DC) groups before earlier 
introductions of councils in 1895 and 1899 with a notable gap emerging from 1898 onwards. 
A further concern for estimation is omitted variable bias, that is, non-zero covariance 
between the error term and treatment status. Unfortunately, the model specification is unable 
to include controls for expenditure on black education since data is unreliable for a number of 
reasons, including missing information as well as the haphazard manner in which educational 
funding was allocated at the time (government school grants for each pupil enrolled were not 
allocated transparently). For example, the bishop of Grahamstown complained that funding for 
schools was significantly skewed, with some public schools receiving ten times as much as 
mission schools that taught mainly low-income black pupils (Education Commission, 1891).  
These payments could have been unrelated to the number of learners. Therefore, the 
expenditure per child in Order C schools, reported as equal amounts across Transkei districts 
irrespective of council status, may not be the only source of financial support received from 




time and policies favouring so-called ‘poor white people,’ the grant per black child decreased 
over the period 1896 to 1900, reaching pre-1896 levels again in 1906 and stagnating thereafter 
as depicted in Figure 2.4. The inclusion of district fixed effects is anticipated to capture 
unobservable, district-invariant factors, including expenditure on education.  
 
 
Figure 2.2: Enrolments in Transkei black primary schools   
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Blue Book data, using the Cape Colony Superintendent-General’s annual 
reports on education.  
Notes: I combined the enrolment of the four districts that became DCs in 1895 with the one district that also 





Figure 2.3 Attendance in Transkei - black pupils 





Figure 2.4 Government grant per child in Order C schools 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Blue Book data using the Cape Colony Superintendent-General’s annual 
reports on education.  
 
It is also unclear from the available data exactly how much funding (taxes and 
government subsidies) DCs raised towards education. From secondary literature however, it 
appears that school funding in DCs was higher than in non-DCs (non-DC schools received 
government subsidies only). Therefore, should a positive impact of DCs on enrolment and 
attendance emerge from the empirical results that follow, it is arguably partly through the 
mechanism of higher expenditure and educational expansion allowed for by the tax funds 
collected.  
2.3.2 Empirical estimation: difference-in-difference results 
 
Table 2.5 presents DID regression estimates, based on equation [1], for the two schooling 
outcome variables separately. The primary coefficients of interest representing the time trends 
(𝜆) and treatment impact (𝛽) on black school enrolment are shown in columns (1) and (2) 
respectively and, similarly, for columns (3) and (4) for black school attendance. Overall, the 
enrolment and attendance of black learners in Order C schools increased significantly over the 
period with the average number enrolled and in attendance at Transkei district schools showing 




increase in absolute numbers of enrolment and attendance in DC districts was significantly 
higher than in non-DC districts from 1902 and 1903 onwards, respectively. DC districts are 
estimated to have had 660 more learners enrolled in Aborigine (Order C) schools than non-DC 
districts in 1909 and 510 more learners in attendance.  
 
 Table 2.5: Difference-in-difference regression results based on equation [1] 
 (1)  (2)   (3)  (4)  
Dependent variable: Enrolment  Attendance 
Coefficient: 𝜆 𝛽  𝜆 𝛽 
 
𝛽 𝛽  𝜆 𝛽 
 
𝜆 𝛽  𝜆 
 






























































































































































Observations 413  413 
R-squared 0.26  0.27 
 
Notes: robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** Significant at 1 percent level; ** significant at 5 
percent level; * significant at 10 percent level.  
 




Figures 2.5 and 2.6 using linear combinations of the coefficients shown in Table 2.5. Both DCs 
and non-DCs show increases in attendance over the period. However, from 1898 onwards 
enrolment and attendance amongst DCs start to pull away from those of non-DCs so that by 
the end of the period in question both enrolment and attendance in DCs are significantly higher 
than in non-DCs. In order to incorporate the staggered effect of a multiple-phased roll-out of 
DCs on attendance and enrolment as well as to formally test the parallel trends assumption, I 
estimate equation 2 for both enrolment and attendance in Figure 2.7, presenting plots of the 
DID impact parameters𝛽𝑗 from estimating equation [2]. 
I find support for the parallel trends assumption since all instances of of 𝛽𝑗 for j < 0 are 
not significantly different from zero. The positive effect of the introduction of DC’s impact is 
both significant and increasing for both enrolment and attendance, though the magnitude of the 
impact on attendance appears to lag by several years. Overall, the empirical findings indicate 




Figure 2.5: Enrolment trends – DCs and non-DCs 






Figure 2.6: Attendance trends – DCs and non-DCs 




Figure 2.7: Difference-in-difference regression results (leads and lags) based on equation [2] 





2.3.3 The missionary influence 
 
The discussion so far has shown that the history of black education in South Africa is intimately 
entwined with the history of missions. Therefore, as a robustness check on the main findings 
of section 2.3.2, an empirical investigation of the influence of missions on enrolment and 
attendance in interaction with DCs is necessary.  
Table 2.6 summarises the average number of mission schools by DC group (DC 
introduced prior to 1900, DC introduced in 1903 and DC introduced after 1910) as well as the 
average annual growth in enrolment and attendance over the period 1893 to 1909. It is evident 
that districts where DCs were introduced early have a higher density of mission schools 
compared to districts where councils were only adopted later. This is plausible given the 
support missions had from the DCs (which included financial assistance for mission-
established schools). Enrolment and attendance are also positively related to an earlier 
introduction of a DC, although average annual growth in enrolments and attendance is 
estimated to have been higher among districts that established councils in 1903.   
 
Table 2.6: Mission schools and annual growth in enrolment and attendance according to the year of 
establishing DCs 
DC status 
Number of mission schools 
schoolsss 









mean min max 
Councils prior to 1900  21.2 14 35 5.7% 7.9% 
(Number of districts)       (5)   
Councils in 1903 13.6 2 28 7.6% 9.1% 
(Number of districts)     (10)   
No Council prior to 1909 8.6 2 19 2.2% 3.5% 
(Number of districts)    (12)   
All 12.7 2 35 3.3% 5.8% 
 
Source: Cape Colony Superintendent’s Reports on Education, 1893-1909 
 Figures 2.8 and 2.9 graphically illustrate the estimated parameters  and  from 




number of mission schools, or fewer, in 1893 and those with more than the average number of 
mission schools in 1893. Table 2.6 shows that districts in which DCs were introduced prior to 
1900 all fall in the latter sample. 
As indicated by Figure 2.8, enrolment numbers in districts with above average number 
of mission schools (AMS) witnessed a significant general expansion (i.e. both non-DC and 
DC) from 1898 onwards, whereas the general trend in enrolment numbers in below-AMS 
districts indicates a slower upward movement and even stagnation. By 1905, average enrolment 
in above-AMS districts had grown by 800 to 1000 students, compared to 350 learners in below-
AMS districts. With regard to attendance numbers (see Figure 2.9), the difference in the general 
trends between below and above-AMS districts is more striking as from 1905 onwards 
attendance numbers are estimated to have increased by between 900 and 1000 learners in 
above-AMS districts whereas learner numbers in below-AMS districts increased by around 350 
















Figure 2.8: General enrolment trends   







Figure 2.9: General attendance trends  
Note: Dashed lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals determined using the delta method. 
Figures 2.10 and 2.11 indicate the lead and lag estimates on enrolment and attendance for 
AMS-DC districts only. In contrast to Figures 2.8 and 2.9, it is estimated that both below and 
above-AMS-DC districts witnessed significant growth in enrolment numbers after the 
introduction of DCs although the immediate response to the intervention is more noticeable 
amongst the latter. With regard to attendance numbers, there is a significant immediate 
response to the introduction of DCs in below-AMS-DC districts which grow to approximately 
900 learners six years post-DC introduction. However, in the case of above-AMS DC districts, 
numbers were slower to respond to the intervention.  
Taking the estimates of Figures 2.9 to 2.10 together it can be concluded that although 
enrolment and attendance numbers in below-AMS districts grew at a slower pace more 
generally (an average gap of approximately 500 to 600 learners by 1909) – this gap had halved 
by 1909. The findings here suggest that a greater presence of mission schools is positively 
related to black enrolment and attendance in schools but that the introduction of DCs where 







Figure 2.10: Lead and lag DID estimates on enrolment numbers for below-AMS and above-AMS districts 
Note: lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals determined using the delta method. 
 
 
Figure 2.11: Lead and lag DID estimates on attendance numbers for below-AMS and above-AMS 
districts 





2.4 Empirical results in broader context 
 
Colonial education in the late nineteenth century Cape Colony can be viewed as a conflict 
between the interests of white authorities, missionaries and black people (Ball 1983: 236). 
Missionaries attached education to religious conversion and ‘civilisation’ while black people 
desired schooling in order to advance in society, placing pressure on Rhodes to act on this. The 
changing nature of the economy due to industrialisation and the mineral revolution meant that 
educated labourers were needed. Black people were of economic value as they provided labour 
in the colony, but their numbers posed a political threat to the Cape government. The Cape 
government therefore permitted black people to acquire some education but the level of black 
educational attainment was kept low. Increased access to education seemed to appease black 
demands for more schooling.  
It is also necessary to consider how DCs related to the parliamentary politics of the day. 
Rhodes’ Glen Grey Act and DCs emerged as part of a solution to the Glen Grey district 
‘problem’. There was a strong sentiment amongst Rhodes’ supporters (mainly the Afrikaner 
Bond) that the Glen Grey district was overcrowded, overgrazed and that its residents were both 
lazy and thieves (Glen Grey Commission, 1893; Hofmeyer, 1931). The district was also seen 
as a potential pool of labour supply for an expanding economy. Rhodes also had severe budget 
constraints since the Cape Colony debt was spiralling out of control (Gwaindepi and Fourie, 
2020). These financial pressures may have also contributed to the establishment of DCs that 
would finance themselves, relieving the Cape parliament of that responsibility.  
Finally, as Rhodes struggled to remain in power, he decided to press ahead with the Glen 
Grey Act since it pleased his supporters in parliament (Davenport, 1966; Tamarkin, 1996). 
Furthermore, limiting the education of black pupils to early grades was a strategy devised to 
suppress political mobilization and unrest (Ball 1983, 249). The growth in education outcomes 




2.5. Conclusion  
 
In thinking about the ways through which DCs achieved these educational outcomes, it is 
important to consider the literature on accountability and local government. As black people 
demanded more education, expenditure on schooling followed. This was not unique to the 
Transkei, as Loram (1917) notes this relationship also in Basutoland, where people taxed 
themselves for education and subsequently recorded the highest per capita output expenditure 
on education. As argued by Conyers (1990: 18), Transkei DCs increased engagement in 
economic and political activity at a local level. Tiebout (1956) also notes how consumer spatial 
mobility, commonly referred to as ‘voting with their feet,’ influences local governments’ 
resource allocation since information is more accessible locally than nationally (Oates, 1993: 
238; Martinez‐Vazquez, 2017; Abimbola et al. 2019). The finding that there was a stronger 
positive impact of DC introduction in districts with a lower missionary presence in the 
beginning of the period (1893) supports this. Schools serving black populations that received 
grants-in-aid – attached to increased racial segregation and the advancement of an 
industrialised curriculum for black people – were in a better position to expand. However, funds 
were allocated on a pound-for-pound basis depending on local contributions (Paterson, 1992), 
the impact of which was felt most strongly by rural communities where teachers were not 
getting paid regularly (Paterson, 2005: 385). Support for the Glen Grey Act and the 
establishment of DCs would therefore have served to advance the educational program of the 
missions. However, in districts with only a limited number of mission schools and therefore 
less access to funds, the introduction of a DC would have meant a significant injection of funds 
to support educational provision. 
The Cape government, black people and missionaries played different roles in the 
provision of education in the Transkei. By taking a back seat in the administration of the 




political and financial challenges. He marketed DCs to black people by linking DCs to 
increased education provision. The Transkei case is interesting because it was DCs working 
alongside missionaries in some cases that improved access and not the Cape government.  
This chapter has shown the important role black agency played in improving black 
education outcomes. It was not necessary for the colonial government to spend more in order 
to improve attendance and enrolment since black people desired to improve their children’s 
socio-economic prospects by, for instance, contributing education tax from their relatively 
lower incomes. This challenges the conventional view of a benevolent colonial government 
and supports the work of other scholars such as Frankema (2012), Cogneau and Moradi (2014). 
Maxwell (2016) and Meier zu Selhausen (2019).  
The reversal of democratisation need not be associated with a regression or withdrawal 
of education provision. Improved black education outcomes occurred in a context of 
democratic reversal and in contrast to the literature that links democratisation to the expansion 
of education expansion (e.g. Lindert, 2004; Acemoglu et. al, 2014; Hoffman, 2015; Dahlum et 
al. 2017). This challenges the large consensus on the importance of democratisation for 
education access and shows that the role of democracy may be overstated in the literature 
(Paglayan, 2020). DCs also solved a coordination problem where less education was provided 
before their introduction. In as much as the quality of black Transkei education was inferior to 
that of white schools (mainly due to funding issues), the counterfactual was probably no 





CHAPTER THREE: MIGRATION PERSISTENCE AND THE 




A central aim of Cecil John Rhodes’ Glen Grey Act of 1894 was to recruit black labour from the 
Transkei to work in industries, Kimberley and Transvaal mines and farms in the Western Cape 
(Rotberg, 1988; Nattrass, 1981; Lacey, 1981; Davenport, 1987: 106-8, 141). Rhodes’ 
premiership was dependent upon receiving support from the Afrikaner Bond, who represented 
farmers in the western parts of the Cape Colony (Nicholls, 1993). These farmers, along with 
mining houses and industry, had complained for many years prior to the Glen Grey Acts’ 
enactment, that Cape Colony labour was in short supply (Glen Grey Commission, 1892; Newton-
King, 1980). For example, in the 1890s, the Transvaal Chamber of Mines desired to remove black 
people from peasant farming and coerce them to work underground (Cooper, 1979: 35; Bundy, 
1979: 135-138).  
The Glen Grey Act’s provisions of a labour tax on all black men and the division of 
communal land into small surveyed plots of four morgens (3.2 hectares) applied to Transkei 
districts where District Councils were established. These provisions were designed to pressure 
black men into leaving their land and work for white employers (Ntsebeza, 2005: 66). The hope 
was to turn the area into what would effectively become a labour reserve for various industries 
and, combined with land restrictions, guaranteed Transkei’s economic dependence on South 
Africa (Hammond-Tooke, 1968: 455; Kalule-Sabiti & Kahimbaara, 1995: 81). It is the persistent 
economic effect of these colonial policies that this chapter investigates.  
One of legacies of the Glen Grey Act is persistent migration from the Eastern Cape 
(Gelderblom, 1987). This suggests that the Glen Grey Act may be a helpful case study to study 
how colonial policies have varying persistent effects on present day migration patterns (Mayblin, 




show the persistent economic consequences of historical institutions and policy interventions on 
present day economic outcomes (see Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2018 for an extensive 
review). For example, Michalopoulos and Papaiounnou (2016) find a higher prevalence and 
intensity of civil conflict that lasts longer in the original territories of partitioned African ethnic 
groups than in territories of groups that were not divided by colonial borders. Dell and Olken 
(2020) find that areas close to sugar factories established by the Dutch in Java in the 1800s, have 
better infrastructure and higher rates of employment today than areas where factories did not 
exist. The positive long term persistence of mission stations on present day education has also 
been shown by Caicedo (2019). 
However, persistence studies often struggle to deal with, or neglect migration, an 
important channel of persistence. For example, Dell (2010) found a negative long term impact of 
the Peru mining forced labour system (mita) on household consumption and childhood growth 
in areas where the system was used by colonial authorities from 1573 to 1812. Dell lacked data 
to test her hypothesis that the coercive labour system triggered male migration out of affected 
areas, leading to a decline in output potential as the best educated or those with more means were 
more likely to migrate. Acemoglu at. al (2012) find negative long term effects of slavery in 1843 
on present day poverty, education and public good provision in Colombia. The authors use 1843 
slaves as a proxy for later colonial slavery, but were unable to control for possible migration of 
the 1843 slaves. Thus, the negative effects they report may be overstated. As Fourie and 
Swanepoel (2015) show, the positive coefficient they report for the persistent effect of missionary 
schooling is reduced and no longer significant after controlling for migration. Thus, many 
institutional persistence findings may be inaccurate if selection is not accounted for. 
The importance of this chapter for the persistence literature is that it addresses the issue 
of selection by arguing that a culture of migration emanating from the institution of forced 




attainment. Most migratory decisions are motivated by employment and educational 
opportunities, and the link between migration and education outcomes is well-established within 
the migration economics literature (see Borjas, 1999; Dustmann and Glitz, 2011; Fasani, Llull 
and Tealdi, 2020). Recent contributions to that literature have turned to the effects for non-
migrant education (e.g. Berker, 2009; Hermansen and Birkelund, 2015; Hunt, 2017), particularly 
as the spatial distribution of the school-age population changes the educational opportunities and 
net benefits for non-migrant children in both destination and origin areas (Berker, 2009; Betts, 
1998; Borjas and Katz, 2007; Ottaviano and Peri, 2012). For example, a strain on the local school 
system may be due to an inflow of migrant children and an increase in the average number of 
learners per input (e.g. teachers), but also to a higher density of less-educated parents among in-
migrants. However, benefits to non-migrant residents may arise from a shift in relative skills that 
will allow for higher labour market returns to those with higher levels of education and therefore 
incentivise investment in education (Betts, 1998). It is this approach that I follow in my analysis. 
I study the impact of historical shocks on present-day migration and its impact on non-
migrant primary school and secondary school completion rates, as well as secondary school 
enrolment rates, at the local municipality and district levels. The first key variable of interest is 
the share of recent migrants in the population for a given municipality, and the second key 
variable is an indicator of the previous District Council and former homeland statuses of 
municipalities within the EC. This latter variable will allow me to make inferences about the 
hypothesised persistence of the Glen Grey Act. Dynamic least squares and Generalised Method 
of Moments System (SYS-GMM) analyses are used in combination with several waves (1996, 
2001 and 2011) of the South African national census data to model the municipality/district level 
educational attainment of non-migrant youth in the Eastern Cape (EC), Kwa-Zulu Natal, Western 
Cape and Gauteng provinces. This methodological approach is chosen to deal with endogeneity 




education outcomes over time. 
The empirical analysis of this paper finds no significant relationship between present-day 
internal migration and primary school completion rates of non-migrants. I also do not find a 
relationship between internal migration and secondary school enrolment, although I do find a 
positive effect of internal migration on the secondary school completion rates of non-migrants. 
These findings contribute to the literature on migration and education outcomes such as 
Hermansen and Birkelund (2015) and Hunt (2017), all of whom reported positive effects of 
migration on secondary school completion.  
In my specifications of interest, I show that former DC regions of the former Transkei 
have the lowest school completion rates when compared to other regions of the EC that did not 
receive DCs - this after controlling for differences in socio-economic development, persistence 
in educational attainment outcomes and migration. Similar to a literature in which it is claimed 
that historical interventions have persistent institutional effects on present day outcomes (e.g. 
Acemoglu et al. 2014; Okoye and Pongou, 2014; Chaudhary and Garg, 2015; Waldinger, 2017 
and Caicedo, 2018), I argue that these lower completion rates are an indirect consequence of the 
Glen Grey Act operating through persistent out-migration. 
In my specifications of interest, I show that former DC regions of the former Transkei 
have the lowest completion rates when compared to other regions of the EC that did not receive 
DCs - this after controlling for differences in socio-economic development, persistence in 
educational attainment outcomes and migration. Similar to a literature in which it is claimed that 
historical interventions have persistent institutional effects on present day outcomes (e.g. 
Acemoglu et al. 2014; Okoye and Pongou, 2014; Chaudhary and Garg, 2015; Waldinger, 2017 
and Caicedo, 2018), I argue that these lower completion rates are an indirect consequence of the 
Glen Grey Act operating through persistent out-migration. 




cultural traits specifically (Nunn 2020). For example, Bisin and Verdier (2017) examine 
conditions under which culture and institutions develop and are linked while Giuliano and Nunn 
(2017) study why certain societies change cultural traits and norms, finding that the role of 
environmental stability plays an important role in the transfer of culture.  
 
3.2 Migration persistence - evidence from previous studies 
 
According to Mabogunje (1970), migration patterns are path dependent as migrants are likely to 
move in a similar direction to their predecessors. Migration can persist as information flows from 
migrants to those they left behind (who may later follow) as migrants report on conditions in 
their destinations to those who remained (Mabogunje, 1970). Non-migrants may also be 
motivated to relocate when observing remittance payments from migrants to their families, 
increasing incentives for non-migrants to relocate (Quinn, 2006). Levitt (1998) discusses a form 
of cultural diffusion that is led by migration where ideas, behavioural patterns and identities 
impact ambitions and views of people to drive sustained migration, thus normalising or creating 
a culture of migration 
Migration also persists in a manner that is independent of the initial reasons or factors 
that caused initial migrants to relocate (cumulative causation) (Simon, 2019). After cumulative 
causation is established, migration is strongly determined by social and familial networks that 
eclipse the role of macroeconomic factors or policies that also influence migration patterns 
(Massey et al. 1993).  
Empirical studies of migration path dependency by Tumbe (2012, 2015) showed that 
remittance-based (male dominated) migrations in India persisted over the period 1870 to 2010 in 
several Indian regions. This culture of migration developed due to the role that men play as 
providers in Indian societies, and the dual agriculture-urban economy where men work in cities 




high levels of outmigration offer higher wages to males and employ a larger percentage of women 
than men in agriculture. Rodríguez-Pose and von Berlepsch (2020) also find that Hispanic 
migration to U.S. cities in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries mirrors patterns of 
mass European migration to the same cities. Giuliano and Nunn (2020) claim that if environments 
are similar between generations, then the next generation would find the previous generations’ 
traditions to be of value. 
Persistence of norms and values of migrant families have also been shown by Ramey 
(2019), who finds that mass migration triggered by severe drought from the southern States 
(especially from Oklahoma) to the western States in the 1930s has a persistent effect on political 
outcomes today. “Okie migrants created a cultural setting that has subsequently affected 
everyone living in the former Okie heartland, irrespective of ethnic background”. Oklahoman 
migrants continue to vote Republican even though the areas that they migrated to have 
overwhelmingly become Hispanic – Hispanics in California generally vote for Democrats.  
Historical migration has also been shown to affect human capital. For instance, Carpio 
and Guerrero (2020) use district level surnames of people living in mita and non-mita districts to 
support Dell’s (2010) hypothesis that migration caused by the Peru mita has persisted and 
contributed to lowering development outcomes in Peru today. Applying a regression 
discontinuity design to study whether differences in the prevalence of surnames shows migration, 
Carpio and Guerrero (2020) find that mita districts have nearly half the number of surnames 
present in non-mita districts. Similarly, Becker et al. (2020) use 2015 Polish survey data to study 
the effects of forced Polish migration caused by the Second World War on present day education 
outcomes. They find that Polish descendants of forced migrants from the Kresy region higher 
levels of education attainment than the rest of Polish citizens. The authors claim their findings 
indicate a large change in cultural preferences of migrant descendants toward accumulating 




migrant descendants value education more than they do acquiring material goods.  
Persistent effects of migration on present day economic outcomes have also been recently 
shown by Sequiera, Nunn and Qian (2020) who study the economic impact of the wave of 
European migration into the U.S. that occurred from around 1850 to 1920. They find that 
migration led to faster industrialisation, greater levels of education, agricultural productivity and 
incomes in today with no negative spill over effects on neighbouring counties that did not 
received fewer migrants.  
 
3.2.1 Persistent institutions and development outcomes 
 
History, institutions, geography and policies have been shown to determine cultural persistence. 
Becker et al. (2016) finds that well run historical institutions from the Habsburg Empire that 
ruled in Europe from 1273 to 1918, are associated with higher trust in government today in areas 
where the institutions were located. They further claim that these values persisted even though 
large migration waves occurred. Buggle et al. (2017) show that areas with a high climatic 
variability exhibit greater political cooperation that was fostered by the need to overcome the 
elements. Finally Guiso et al. (2016) find that Italian cities that achieved self-government show 
greater independence values and self-sufficiency beliefs for self-governance today when 
compared to cities in the same regions that did not become self-governing. 
One example of a study that investigated institutional persistence in Africa is Merrouche 
(2007: 3). Using instrumental variables to analyse the relationship between foreign settlement in 
Algeria in 1954 and literacy for the period 1977 to 1998, Merrouche finds a persistent effect. 
Specifically, literacy rates in Algeria rose much faster after independence from the French in 
regions that had received greater settler educational spending and had better infrastructures. 
Furthermore, these effects lost magnitude as migration increased to settlement areas which were 




Other examples of persistent institutions are found in Chaudhary and Garg (2015) who 
study the impact colonial spending had on educational outcomes in the 1970s and 1980s for 
nearly 150 Indian districts. Their instrumental variable approach shows that colonial spending 
on primary schools in 1911 had a persistent influence on literacy until the 1970s. This effect 
becomes insignificant by 1981, as the Indian government increased public expenditure on 
education. However, evidence contrary to the literature on institutions does exist (c.f. North and 
Weingast, 1989; Schäfer and Wulf, 2014; Spruk and Kovac, 2020). For example, Spruk and Mitja 
(2020) argue that the districts closer to the Audiencia Real, a colonial legal institution in Peru, 
show lower levels of schooling, infrastructure and private ownership of land than those regions further 
from the legal control of the Audencia. They argue that under-provision of education could be the 
result of decreased migration to Audencia districts, which reduced the development of human 
capital, compared to non-Audencia districts.  
 
3.2.2 Missionaries and education  
 
Important recent literature on the relationship between missionaries and educational outcomes in 
the American and (predominantly West) African contexts include Becker and Woessmann 
(2009), Gallego and Woodberry (2010), Woodberry (2012), Okoye and Pongou (2014), 
Wantchekon, Klašnja and Novta (2015), and Caicedo (2018). Although these studies have made 
use of varying methodologies, all find evidence of a strong persistence of missionary work on 
schooling outcomes, economic development and democracy. Areas where missionaries settled 
are found to have higher levels of literacy, pass rates, infrastructure and agricultural innovation 
amongst other economic outcomes.  
Okoye and Pongou (2014) provide evidence for the African context by measuring the 
persistence effect of historical missionary education in Nigeria on recent schooling outcomes. 




Their results show that individuals belonging to ethnic groups from areas with more mission 
stations in 1928 achieve higher schooling levels in the present day. Huillery (2009) similarly 
shows strong persistence patterns in the former French West Africa, with inequality in education, 
infrastructure and health investments between districts in the colonial era accounting for one-
third of present day school attendance. Finally, Wantchekon et al. (2015) find that Benin villages 
with missionary schools in the colonial period have higher levels of schooling today, compared 
to neighbouring villages with no missionary schools.   
 An example of a study of Latin American missionary persistence is that of Waldinger 
(2017), who compares present-day schooling outcomes for Mexican regions where mendicant 
orders and Jesuits established missions to those that never had missions. Using a dataset with 
exact locations of the missions’ sites, Waldinger finds that children in areas that had mendicant 
missions spent 0.69 years longer in school than those in areas with no missions. Additionally, 
literacy levels are currently three per cent greater in former mendicant mission areas, whilst no 
differences in educational outcomes between former Jesuit mission areas and those that did not 
have missions are found. 
Recent criticism of long-term missionary studies has come from Jedwab, et al. (2018), 
who argue against the empirical strategies common in the literature. Specifically, they argue that 
the methodological approaches do not address the endogeneity of missions, as missionaries chose 
locations for selective reasons that can lead to bias in the impact estimates. Furthermore, they 
highlight the issues arising from using old atlases for mission locations, as these tend to be grossly 
inaccurate, exclude multiple mission stations, and generate noisy variables. Their study found 
that the non-random nature of mission station selection can explain many of the results in the 
literature that show persistent effects, as neglecting to control adequately for early mission 
selection results in over-emphasised persistent effects of missionaries on present-day outcomes.   




Woessmann (2009) and Caicedo (2018) control for migration and do not find any difference in 
their results after doing so. Caicedo’s South American missionary persistence study does not find 
evidence of people sorting themselves into former missionary areas in the present era. Becker et. 
al study of the spread of Protestantism during the middle Ages and its effects on late nineteenth 
century education in Prussia and they control for the migration of the 1871 population whose 
census data they study.  
 
3.3. The education context 
 
One of the motivations for internal migration by household with children is educational quality. 
Therefore, to better understand education outcomes, it is necessary to provide a brief overview 
of the schooling system in South Africa generally, and the Transkei specifically, in historical and 
contemporary context, as well as an investigation of enrolment numbers since the amalgamation 
of the schooling system post-1994.   
The education system inherited by the ANC led government in 1994 was racially 
segregated and highly unequal. In 1953, the apartheid government introduced Bantu Education 
for South African students of colour (black, coloured, and Indian) that offered an education far 
inferior to what which white learners received (Christie and Collins, 1982: 171; Rakometsi 2008: 
2; Ndimande, 2013: 22). Although the advent of Bantu Education can be seen as a formalisation 
of segregationist schooling practices in South Africa, these practices already existed long before 
1953. As discussed in Chapter Two, the racial segregation of schools was actively encouraged 
from 1891 onwards, with the result that from 1910 to 1953 white students enjoyed an education 
far superior to what was provided, mainly by mission schools, to black learners (Giliomee, 2009: 
197).11  
                                                     
11 This can be seen most acutely in the fact that the ratio of spending on education for white as opposed to black 




While white primary education was compulsory and free under apartheid, black education 
was neither. Between 1953 and 1961 the amount spent on each black learner fell from R17 to 
R12 at the same time that enrolment rose from over 900 000 to just over 1.5 million. By 1970, 
2.75 million black learners were attending school (Giliomee, 2012: 79). By comparison, white 
learners in 1960 numbered 712 300 yet an amount of R145 was allocated to each learner, 12-
times greater than that allocated to black learners.12 A period of schooling expansion occurred 
under the presidency of P.W. Botha, mainly in response to growing demands for human capital 
and the aftermath of the violent student protests of 1976 where black students in Soweto refused 
to study in Afrikaans. As a result, the number of secondary students increased four-fold between 
1975 and 1985. This was accompanied by a narrowing of the gap between white and black 
spending per learner with the ratio in 1994 dropping to 2.7:1 from 7:1 ten years earlier.13  
Unlike other provinces, the Eastern Cape and Transkei follow a system according to which 
learners complete Grades one to nine in one school and Grades 10 to 12 in another. In 2013, more 
than 40 percent of all learners in the EC were enrolled in schools offering this particular grade 
configuration compared to less than 10 percent nationally. This spatial distribution of schools 










                                                     
linked to a stagnation in central government funding for black schools combined with rising scholar numbers and 
severe teacher shortages from the 1920s through to the advent of Bantu Education (Christie and Collins, 1982: 62).  
12 The higher spending on white education was partly driven by the higher remuneration for white teachers who, on 
average, had superior qualifications and benefited from a discriminatory system.   
13 Giliomee (2012: 78-79) argues that per capita spending on black education would have been higher had the 
apartheid government not funded large outlays on black school infrastructure from the Public Works instead of the 
Education Department’s budget. Giliomee argues that the reason for this was to avoid a backlash from the white 
electorate. He further states that attempts to bridge the per capita spending gaps were frustrated by the birth rate in 




Table 3.1: Grade configurations in 2013 according to province 
 
Grades EC FS GP KZN LP MP NC NW WC SA 
1 to 7 21 36 51 42 48 39 36 46 52 42 
8 to 12 13 23 31 36 42 28 20 21 32 29 
1 to 9 42 9 1 5 1 6 6 3 4 9 
1 to 12 3 6 7 5 3 5 5 4 4 5 
10 to 12 11 5 1 1 0 3 3 5 0 3 
Other 10 21 9 11 6 19 30 21 8 12 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Gustafson (2016). Figures represent the percentages of learners within a province in the range Grade one 
to Grade 12   
 
Between 1999 and 2013, the Transkei experienced a notable decline in learner density with 
annual decreases in Grade two enrolments of three to five percent across most districts.14 Hall 
(2017) similarly shows a loss in enrolments of approximately 350 000 learners in the EC over 
the period 2002 to 2017. In order to understand the extent to which changes in learner distribution 
are related to urbanisation, Gustafson (2016) compares changes in Grade two enrolments across 
metro and non-metro areas of the country. He found an average annual gain of 2 368 learners in 
metros and an average annual loss of 8 000 learners in non-metros. However, the two metro areas 
of the EC, namely Nelson Mandela Bay and Buffalo City, experienced declines. A contributing 
factor to these decline in learner numbers can be the generally poor performance of schools in 
the province. According to one of the most recent nationally representative school surveys, the 
2016 Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS), South African Grade 4 learners 
ranked last out of all 50 participating countries. EC performance was only marginally above that 
of Limpopo, the weakest performing province in South Africa. Furthermore, 85 percent of EC 
learners assessed could not read for meaning compared to 55 percent of learners in the WC 
(Howie et al., 2016: 76).  
According to Venkat and Spaull (2015) poor teacher content knowledge limits efforts to 
improve education quality and learner performance. EC teacher knowledge is shown to be 
                                                     
14 See Table A1 in the appendix for more detail on changes in learner numbers across Eastern Cape districts 




amongst the lowest in the country (Venkat & Spaull, 2015). The EC has also been recorded as 
having the second highest rates of teacher absenteeism among all provinces, with 12 percent of 
teachers failing to show up to teach on any given day. EC teachers also spend the least number 
of hours per year on professional development, three-times lower than teachers in the WC (DBE, 
2017). Similar trends are observed for school principals who spend half the amount of time on 
capacity development than their Gauteng and WC counterparts. School infrastructure in the EC 
is also among the worst in South Africa. According to the ECDoE, in 2009, just less than half of 
all provincial schools were regarded as being in a weak or very weak condition. Failure to provide 
suitable infrastructure in rural areas has contributed to the pace of de-ruralisation, as well-
resourced urban areas exert a ‘pull’ on learners and their parents (Hendricks & Wright, 2012).  
Figure 3.1 below indicates the change in Grade two enrolment over the period 2002 to 
2013, across the different former education departments of the ECDoE, adjusted for endogeneity 
and selection linked to unobserved school quality and other unobservable factors.15 The 
enrolment data has been normalised to base year 2002, so that the plotted coefficients represent 
the percentage point change in enrolment from a baseline of 100 percent.  
All former education systems experienced disenrollment from 2006 onwards, with the 
Ciskei showing a much higher disenrollment than the Transkei until 2010. By 2010, Grade two 
enrolment numbers in the Ciskei were 25 percent lower than eight years earlier, and 20 and 18 
percent lower in the former Transkei and DET departments, respectively. However, although a 
downward trend is observed for the former HOA, HOD and HOR departments until 2009, Grade 
two disenrollment figures never extend beyond 4 percent and return again to their 2005 level in 
2012. By 2013, disenrollment in the former Ciskei and DET departments also recover to 10 
                                                     
15 As argued by Gustafson (2016), Grade two enrolments are a better indicator of enrolments than Grade one since 





percent but remains stable in the Transkei at 20 percent.   
Disenrollment has been strongest among the former Transkei proper and Thembuland (see 
Figure 3.2). For the moment it is difficult to say what accounts for these differences. Performance 
in the Transkei has historically been weaker compared to the rest of the EC; for example, Lemon 
(2004) provides evidence of worsening Senior Certificate (school-leaving) pass rates in a third 
of the 24 Transkei districts between 1999 and 2001. Over the same period the rate of 
matriculation exemption passes that allow access to tertiary education dropped in 21 districts – 
this, compared to an improvement in performance in the majority (80 percent) of school districts 
in the Ciskei. There is, therefore, a strong east-west contrast in performance across the EC which 
correlates with urbanisation and population density. In the Transkei only the urban centres of 
Umtata and Butterworth achieved matriculation exemption rates on par with those of the Ciskei 
and the more sparsely populated areas of the non-homeland EC.  
 
Figure 3.1: Grade two enrolment trends across all former Eastern Cape education departments, 2002-2013 
 
Notes: These are my own calculations based on SNAPS 2002-2013 data. Only those schools that appeared in all 
years of the SNAPS data are considered to account for the effect of school closure on enrolment. Dashed lines 
represent 95 percent confidence intervals derived from standard errors that are computed using the delta method. 
HOA, HOD and HOR represent the former House of Assembly (white), House of Democrats (coloured) and House 
of Representatives (Indian) education systems, respectively. DET represents the former Department of Education 








Figure 3.2: Grade two enrolment trends across the former Transkei, 2002-2013 
Notes: These are my own calculations based on SNAPS 2002-2013 data. Only those schools that appeared in all 
years of the SNAPS data are considered to account for the effect of school closure on enrolment. Dashed lines 
represent 95 percent confidence intervals derived from standard errors that are computed using the delta method. 
 
3.4  Migration in historical context 
Historically, the creation of the former homelands played a significant role in the migrant labour 
system of South Africa. According to Delius (2017), reserves were established as a means to 
draw cheap labour for white owned farms and mines. The perennial labour shortage problems of 
farmers in both the WC and Natal were solved by migrant labour from the Transkei and Ciskei.  
White farmers and Anglo-controlled mining companies advocated for the creation of black 
reserves through the 1913 Land Act and early pass laws (Schierup, 2016: 1053). The result was 
the establishment of ‘influx control’ which not only increased labour supply, but also reduced 
the cost of unskilled labourers who otherwise would have sought higher-wage employment in 
urban areas (Mncube and Harber, 2013). 
It was, however, under the apartheid regime that labour regulation took prominence as an 
“extreme extra-economic coercion of the majority of the workforce” (Legassick, 1974: 255). 




Commission, concluded that black movement to urban centres was inevitable (Nattrass, 1983: 
13). The National Party government elected soon afterwards rejected these findings, choosing 
instead to return to the 1922 Stallard Commission that concluded that the right to reside in towns 
was the sole prerogative of white people, as well as the Native Economic Commission of 1930-
1932 that identified black urbanisation as cause of higher levels of unemployment among the 
unskilled white population (Beinart, 2001: 122).  
Building upon existing legislation such as the Development Trust and Land Act of 1936, 
the migrant labour system and spatial allocation of labour became permanently institutionalised 
following the 1945 Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, the 1967 Physical Planning Act and 
the 1968 Promotion of the Economic Development of the Homelands Act. Former non-migrants 
were now reclassified as foreigners which, along with the establishment of centralised labour 
bureaus set up to monitor the movement of this non-migrant labour force, set in motion a 
“permanent condition of rural-urban migrancy” (Schierup, 2016: 1053). 
Legislation served to resettle hundreds of thousands of black people not only from urban 
centres (Muller, 1984) but also from white rural areas to overcrowded villages that were severely 
lacking in economic activity. Bundy and Beinart (1987: 275) describe how the Transkei’s 
economic development was neglected from the turn of the century until the official onset of 
apartheid in order to drive productivity down and increase the general level of indebtedness in 
order to ensure a readily available labour pool.  
Without productive land to farm there was no other choice for workers but to seek work as 
temporary/contract migrant labourers in urban areas. Muller (1984), citing Nattrass (1976) and 
Benso (1982), notes that the number of migrants from rural homeland areas increased three-fold 
between 1938 and 1980. As argued by Nattrass (1983: 17) such a migrant labour system becomes 
self-perpetuating since economic participation outside the homelands, particularly by the youth 




As a result, oscillating migration tripled in scope from around 500 000 in 1936 to just over 1.3 
million workers by 1980 (Nattrass, 1976; Benso, 1982). 
In the early 1980s, 66 percent of all Transkei workers were working outside the Transkei 
in the mining sector (Muller, 1983a; 1984: 16) and already by 1976, 75 percent of a typical 
Transkei family’s income came from migrant remittances, which contributed significantly to the 
decline in subsistence agriculture (Boulle, 1982). 16   
Labour migrancy also contributed to an age and gender imbalance inside the former 
homelands. For instance, the 1970 Transkei census estimated that at least half the male population 
were either below or above working age, and at least half of the remaining population were absent 
migrants (Wilson, 1972). In a study of life-time migration in the former Transkei, Kalule-Sabiti 
and Kahimbaara (1993) found that prior to 1970 the Transkei experienced net-out migration to 
the mines. However, migration dynamics were reversed in the 1970s following internal self-rule 
and political independence.  
Between 1980 and 1990 in-migration occurred at a faster pace. Two-thirds of all migrants 
were aged 15-44, whereas 68 percent of non-migrants were younger than 15 years of age. They 
also found that most internal Transkei migration was from rural to urban centres with the largest 
share of these migration inflows coming from South Africa and comprised people aged 55 years 
and older. Finally, the authors state that internal rural to urban migration had risen with a 
disproportionate level of inflow targeting the urban centres of Umtata, Butterworth and Lady 
Frere.  
In the mid-to-late 1908s some of the most salient features of South Africa included 
                                                     
16 A mining labour supply crunch in the late 1970s caused by the withdrawal of Malawian and Mozambican mine 
workers from South Africa increased demand for domestic labour to replace the foreign workers. The number of 
Transkei mine labour recruits rose from 85,345 in 1975 to 167,271 by 1977 (Crush et al. 1991, 236–37). Mariotti 
(2015) found that Transkei men born in 1975 and 1976 are on average about one centimetre taller than men from 
other homelands that were not impacted on by this recruitment drive. This demonstrates the positive effect of the 




recession, international sanctions, as well as large migration flows (Schierup, 2016: 1053). The 
exclusion of a majority of black people from the skilled labour force could no longer be 
economically or socially justified. Restrictions on the mobility of black people were lifted 
between 1986 and 1991 and represented the first instances of freedom of movement in more than 
four decades. Despite growing representation of black people in top-tier occupations and the 
middle and upper-middle classes, a large reserve of cheap, precarious labour continues to exist, 
especially among black women, youth and internal migrants (Gentle, 2011). Additionally, whilst 
poverty and unemployment continue to be significantly concentrated in former homeland areas, 
living conditions in the densely populated peri-urban informal settlements are similarly dire, with 
high inflows of internal migrants (Schierup, 2016: 1055).  
Casale et. al (2003, 2006) show that circular labour migration and the reliance of 
households on remittances from migrant workers remained significant during the first decade of 
democracy. At the onset of democracy, the EC and its former homelands continued to be one of 
the largest senders of migrants to other provinces. Between 1992 and 1996, close to 250 000 
people left the EC, 80 percent of whom moved to Kwa-Zulu Natal, WC and Gauteng. Using the 
1996 Census, Kok et al. (1999: 42) show the clear “dominance of the former homeland areas as 
a reservoir of migrant workers.” They found that in several districts of the Transkei, the size of 
the ex-migrant population is almost equivalent to that of the population who did not migrate. As 
argued by Posel (2010), the continued prevalence of temporary migrant labour post-apartheid 
might be indicative of deeply entrenched migration patterns that could over time be supplanted 
by the permanent settlement of individuals and/or households. She refers to the studies by Bekker 
(2001) and Van der Berg et al. (2004) that found lower return migration from the WC to the EC. 
Similar trends are identified using the 2008 National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) which 
indicates significantly lower estimates of labour migration and remittances compared with the 




3.5. Data description 
 
Observations in this chapter are based on the three post-apartheid South African Population 
Censuses (1996, 2001, and 2011) which capture information on change of residence between 
census years that is important for distinguishing migrant from non-migrant individuals and 
households. From this data, I constructed a panel of district and local municipalities. The nine 
South Africa provinces are divided into metropolitan and district municipalities which are then 
subdivided into local municipalities. For the purpose of this study, district municipalities and 
local municipalities will be referred to as districts and municipalities respectively. To construct 
the EC local municipality-level panel data, local municipality codes in all relevant datasets are 
recoded based on the structure of the administrative divisions in the 2011 census. The result is a 
total of 35 municipalities in the Eastern Cape.17 These municipalities are then grouped into three 
regions that represent non-homeland and former tribal authority areas: / 
i. Transkei (TR): Elundini, Engcobo, Ingquza Hill, Intsika Yethu, King Sabata Dalindyebo. 
Mbhashe, Mbizana, Mhlontlo, Mnquma, Ntabankulu, Nyandeni, Port St Johns, 
Sakhisizwe and Umzimvubu.  
ii. Ciskei (CIS): Amahlathi, Buffalo City, Emalahleni, Enoch Mgijima, Ngqushwa, 
Raymond Mhlaba, Inkwanca and Senqu.  
iii. Rest of the Eastern Cape (ROEC): Blue Crane Route, Dr Beyers Naudé, Great Kei, 
Inxuba Yethemba, Kouga, Kou-Kamma, Makana, Ndlambe, Nelson Mandela Bay, 
Sundays River Valley, Tsolwana, Walter Sisulu. 
 
                                                     
17 These are: Amahlathi, Blue Crane Route, Buffalo City, Dr Beyers Naudé (Camdeboo, Ikwezi and Baviaans 
grouped), Elundini, Emalathleni, Engcobo, Great Kei, Ingquza Hill, Inkwanca, Intsika Yethu, Inxuba Yethemba, 
King Sabata Dalindyebo, Kou-Kamma, Kouga, Lukhanji, Makana, Mbhashe, Mbizana, Mhlontlo, Mnquuma, 
Ndlambe, Nelson Mandela Bay, Ngqushwa, Ntabankulu, Nyandeni, Port St Johns, Raymond Mhlaba (Nkonkobe 
and Nxuba grouped), Sakhisizwe, Senqu, Sundays River Valley, Tsolwana, Umzimvubu and Walter Sisulu 




The Transkei municipalities from group (i) above are further subdivided into two groups 
(according to the colonial definitions of the boundaries of the Transkei):18 
iv. Districts that made up the former Chief Magistrates of Transkei Proper and Thembuland 
and comprised the earliest adopters (between 1893 and 1909) of the District Council (DC) 
system, including: Elundini, Engcobo, Intsika Yethu, King Sabata Dalindyebo, Mbhashe, 
Mhlontlo, Mnquma, and UMzimkhulu. The only exception is Sakhisizwe, which resisted 
the adoption of a District Council and joined the Transkeian Territories General Council 
(or Bunga) until 1925. 
v. Districts that made up the Eastern and Western Phondoland and comprised those districts 
that adopted District Councils (under the Phondoland General Council) after 1911 but 
before 1927, including: Ingquza Hill, Mbizana, Ntabankulu, Nyandeni and Port St Johns. 
vi. A final group includes those districts formerly administered by the Ciskei but partly 
transferred to Transkei upon independence in 1976, namely Emalahleni, Enoch Mgijima 
and Senqu.  
 
Migration external to the EC focuses on the districts of three receiving provinces, that 
account for just more than half of all destination regions of individuals migrating (internally and 
externally) from the EC. Twenty-two districts are included, namely: Cape Town Metro, Central 
Karoo, Eden, Overberg, West Coast, Winelands districts of the Western Cape province;, 
Ekurhuleni, Johannesburg Metro, Sedibeng, Tshwane Metro, West Rand districts of the Gauteng 
province; and, Amajuba, eThekwini, iLembe, Harry Gwala, King Cetshwayo, Ugu, 
Umgungundlovu, Umkhanyakude, Umzinyathi, Uthukela and Zululand districts of the Kwa-Zulu 
Natal province.  
                                                     
18 Specifically, the Transkei includes districts located between the Great Kei River and the Umtamvuna River, which 




The non-migrant and migrant status of individuals older than 5 years19 is determined 
using information about mobility across municipalities within five years prior to the census. Non-
migrant residents are defined as individuals reporting to reside in the same municipality five 
years prior to and at the time of the census. Recent migrants (from this point on referred to simply 
as migrants) are defined as individuals residing in a different municipality to that of their current 
residence at least five years prior to and at the time of the census. For example, a migrant in the 
2001 (2011) census would be defined as an individual whose district or municipality changed 
sometime between 1996 and 2001 (2006 and 2011). A distinction is also made between those 
migrants who moved at least three years prior to the census; that is, between 1996 and 1998 in 
the case of the 2001 census, or 2006 and 2008 in the case of the 2011 census.  
In South Africa, education is compulsory up to and including grade 9. The primary 
school-age population usually consists of children aged 6 to 13 years, whilst the secondary 
school-age population usually consists of children aged 14 to 18 years. In the empirical analysis, 
I focus on three educational outcomes at the municipal and district levels: primary-school 
completion, secondary-school enrolment, and secondary-school completion. This follows closely 
the approach taken by Berker (2009) and Hunt (2017).  
None of the data sets under consideration provide information on where individuals lived 
when they received education. To increase the chances of matching information on the place of 
residence and education of children, primary-school completion rates are calculated for children 
aged 15 to 18 years — who would have been 10 to 13 years old five years prior to the census 
data being collected — whilst secondary-school completion rates are computed for 19 to 21 year-
olds — who would have been 14 to 16 years old five years prior to the census data being 
                                                     
19 Given the timeframe in which recent migration is considered, the sample of individuals aged 5 years and younger 





collected. Secondary school enrolment at the time of the census survey is computed for 
individuals aged 15 to 17 years.  
 
3.5.1 Migration trends 
 
Table 3.2 presents the migrant to non-migrant ratio by age group within the different 
regions of the EC (as defined by groups i-vi), and the Gauteng, Kwa-Zulu Natal and WC 
provinces. Several trends are evident. Firstly, municipalities in the early DC and Pondoland areas 
display dramatically lower migrant to non-migrant ratios compared to the rest of the EC, 
particularly among groups younger than 21 years of age. Secondly, the migrant to non-migrant 
ratios in the WC and Gauteng provinces are two- to six-times higher than in the EC with the 
highest differences observed amongst school-going age groups. Thirdly, migrant to non-migrant 
ratios in the EC increased between 2001 and 2011. In the fourth and final instance, excluding the 
Transkei regions, migrant to non-migrant ratios are observed to have been higher in 1996 than in 
2001 and 2011.  
Panel A of Tables 3.3 and 3.4 (pages 94 and 95) provides information for recent movements 
into and out of the EC. Internal migration within the EC, where the focus is exclusively on those 
who changed their municipality of residence, has generally declined over time. At the same time, 
migration to Gauteng and Kwa-Zulu Natal have increased, most notably among individuals 
originating from the former homelands. Approximately 30-40 percent of all migrants originating 
in municipalities of the Pondoland moved to Kwa-Zulu Natal whereas approximately half of the 
migrants originating in municipalities of the Transkei moved to Gauteng and the WC. Combined 
with the information contained in panel B of Tables 3.3 and 3.4, the inter-regional and inter-






Table 3.2: Migrant to non-migrant ratio (%) by region and age group 
Census: 1996  2001  2011 





















Non-former homeland 7.54 7.75 9.57 
 
4.80 6.28 6.87 
 
3.97 5.89 7.37 
Ciskei 6.10 6.47 8.51  4.46 5.20 6.92  4.56 6.26 7.81 
Transkei early District 
Council 
1.72 3.34 5.78 
 
1.76 2.73 5.28 
 
2.26 3.88 6.16 
Transkei Pondoland 0.95 1.98 3.02  1.14 2.00 3.15  1.24 2.34 4.08 
Ciskei transferred to Transkei 3.09 4.80 7.20 
 
2.50 3.95 6.54 
 
3.71 5.23 7.95 
Eastern Cape 3.46 4.78 7.28  2.66 3.93 5.98  2.87 4.54 6.82 
Gauteng 24.14 24.65 28.27  10.46 14.96 15.25  9.23 14.97 16.40 
Kwa-Zulu Natal 8.76 10.42 14.69  3.14 4.36 5.74  3.04 4.83 6.82 
Western Cape 17.34 18.77 21.88  7.11 10.23 10.92  6.46 9.45 10.83 
Note: migrants are defined as individuals who changed their municipality of residence in the five years prior to the 
census.  
 
Table A2 of the appendix shows that a significant amount of mobility occurs within 
municipalities, particularly in the Ciskei and non-homeland areas of the EC. This matches what 
was observed by Gustafson (2016) in terms of learner enrolment volatility within districts. In 
fact, approximately 50 percent of individuals originating in municipalities of the Ciskei and non-
homeland EC who changed their place of residence in the five years prior to each census, 
relocated within the same municipality. This is opposed to less than 30 percent of migrants 




Table 3.3: Distribution of Eastern Cape migrants changing municipality of residence and socio-economic indicators 




 Transkei  Ciskei transferred to 
Transkei   Early District Council  Pondoland  
A: Regional migration 
patterns 
1996 2001 2011 
 
1996 2001 2011 
 











Non-homeland 39.19 19.62 18.89  11.45 9.59 12.51  0.88 2.12 7.64  0.17 1.25 2.36  2.56 2.60 4.08 
Ciskei 23.38 19.15 15.46  24.46 12.63 9.18  2.04 3.48 7.19  0.38 2.06 2.73  5.86 3.39 3.15 
Transkei:                    
Early District 
Council 
2.24 4.48 2.84  7.31 7.37 5.81  14.30 9.41 8.61  3.42 3.29 2.70  5.26 4.34 2.98 
Pondoland 1.64 2.14 1.41  1.76 2.25 1.83  19.66 13.36 7.79  10.74 8.08 8.87  5.78 4.07 2.00 
Ciskei transferred to 
Transkei 
5.98 6.36 5.44  6.95 4.81 4.53  8.18 6.15 4.56  1.80 1.92 3.04  9.56 3.99 5.27 
B: Socio-economic indicators 1996 2001 2011  1996 2001 2011  1996 2001 2011  1996 2001 
201
1 
 1996 2001 2011 
Average per capita income 1 694 2 158 2 645  1 188 1 605 2 305  532 694 1 068  389 556 746  555 710 1 231 
Population in rural areas 11.6 12.4 9.5  46.6 43.5 32.8  90.8 89.0 83.6  98.6 97.8 97.4  79.1 77.1 67.8 
Source: Migration patterns and socioeconomic indicators are from own calculations using the 1996, 2001 and 2011 national censuses.  










Table 3.4: Distribution of Eastern Cape migrants changing municipality of residence and regional human development index scores 
 Destination provinces 
 Eastern Cape  Western Cape  Gauteng  Kwa-Zulu Natal  Remaining provinces 











Non-homeland 54.3 35.2 45.5  25.65 26.68 19.25  10.32 19.85 16.90  2.78 6.85 8.55  7.00 11.43 9.83 
Ciskei 56.1 40.7 37.7  26.71 27.40 30.56  9.90 14.65 17.85  2.74 7.53 5.01  4.53 9.71 8.86 
Transkei:                    
Early District Council 32.5 28.9 22.9  34.02 35.45 28.11  16.72 17.14 22.24  7.93 8.87 10.85  8.80 9.66 15.87 
Pondoland 39.6 29.9 21.9  6.37 8.46 9.25  10.60 11.44 13.56  32.53 34.45 37.42  10.91 15.74 17.88 
Ciskei transferred to Transkei 32.5 23.2 22.8  35.54 32.51 26.33  16.59 21.67 28.25  5.19 12.22 9.06  10.22 10.36 13.53 
B: Socio-economic indicators 1995 2000 2010  1995 2000 2010  1995 2000 2010  1995 2000 2010  1995 2000 2010 
Human Development Index 0.60 0.58 0.62  0.73 0.70 0.70  0.72 0.69 0.70  0.61 0.59 0.64  0.64 0.62 0.65 
Source: Migration patterns from own calculations using the 1996, 2001 and 2011 national censuses. HDI values from the Sub-National HDI Area Database of the Global Data Lab 
(hdi.globaldata.org) 
Note: migrants are defined as individuals who changed their municipality of residence in the five years prior to the census.  
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3.5.2 Trends in educational attainment 
 
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 indicate that regardless of children’s migrant status, educational attainment 
improved significantly between 1996 and 2011. Non-migrant resident children tend to have 
lower rates of school completion than their migrant counterparts. It is also evident that school 
completion rates in the former Transkei regions of the EC are lower than those in either the 
former Ciskei or non-homeland regions, and secondary-school completion rates in the EC are 
as much as half that of Kwa-Zulu Natal, Gauteng and the WC. That said, the rate of increase 
in completion rates over time has been higher among non-migrant residents which suggests 
that the non-migrant-to-migrant ratio has declined over time. This is especially the case in areas 
of the former Transkei where the gaps in primary and secondary-school completion rates have 
been halved. Conversely, the non-migrant to migrant gap in secondary-school completion rates 
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Table 3.5: Primary-school attainment by migrant status and region: 1996, 2001 and 2011 censuses 
 Primary schooling 
 
1996 2001 




2001     
– 2011 
(%Δ) 
1996      
– 2011 
(%Δ) 












































































Eastern Cape region:       































































































Note: The sample of analysis for complete primary-school education is individuals aged 15 to 18-years. 
Standard deviations are indicated in parentheses. 
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Table 3.6: Secondary school attainment by migrant status and region: 1996, 2001 and 2011 censuses 
  Secondary schooling 
 1996 2001 
1996       
– 2001 
(%Δ) 2011 
2001     
– 2011 
(%Δ) 
1996      
– 2011 
(%Δ) 












































































Eastern Cape region:       































































































Note: The sample of analysis for complete secondary school education is individuals aged 19 to 21-years. 
Standard deviations are indicated in parentheses. 
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That said, the rate of increase in completion rates over time has been higher among non-
migrant residents, which suggests that the non-migrant-to-migrant ratio has declined over time. 
This is especially the case in areas of the former Transkei where the gaps in primary and 
secondary-school completion rates have been halved. Conversely, the non-migrant-to-migrant 
gap in secondary-school completion rates doubled in the non-homeland and Ciskei 
municipalities of the EC over the time period under consideration.  
 
3.6. Estimation framework 
 
Following the approaches of Berker (2009) and Hunt (2017), I estimate, as an initial first 
step, regression models at the individual-level to calculate district and municipality education 
outcomes adjusted for the characteristics of non-migrants and migrants. Specifically, the 
following linear probability regressions are estimated: 
𝑃(𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡 ≥ 7) = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼3 ∑ 𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑎18
𝑎=15 + 𝛼4𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + ∑ ∑ 𝜃𝑗𝑡(𝛿𝑗 × 𝜈𝑡)𝑡𝑗 + 𝜔𝑖𝑗𝑡      
[3.1] 
𝑃(𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡 ≥ 12) = 𝜙0 + 𝜙1𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜙2𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜙3 ∑ 𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑎21
𝑎=19 + ∑ ∑ 𝜆𝑗𝑡(𝛿𝑗 × 𝜈𝑡)𝑡𝑗 + 𝜂𝑖𝑗𝑡  
 [3.2] 
𝑃(𝐸𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡) = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾3 ∑ 𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑎17
𝑎=15 + 𝛾4𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + ∑ ∑ 𝜋𝑗𝑡(𝛿𝑗 × 𝜈𝑡)𝑡𝑗 + 𝜉𝑖𝑗𝑡
  [3.3] 
where 𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡 and 𝐸𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡 are the educational attainment and enrolment status of individual 𝑖 in 
municipality/district 𝑗 at time 𝑡, respectively, 𝐹 is a gender dummy, 𝑅 are race dummies, 𝐴𝑎 
are age dummy variables, 𝛿𝑗 are municipality/district dummies and 𝜈𝑡 are time dummies. The 
vector 𝑋 contains household-level covariates including the educational attainment of the 
household head, the household composition (number of children, working-aged adults and 
retired persons) and per capita income.20 Regressions [3.1] to [3.3] are weighted using census 
person weights.  
                                                     
20 Tables AX and AX of the appendix to this chapter provide descriptive statistics of these control variables. 
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In a second step, the coefficients 𝜃𝑗𝑡 , ?̂?𝑗𝑡 and ?̂?𝑗𝑡 are used as the dependent variable in a 
municipality/district panel analysis: 
           𝜃𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑗𝑡
15−18 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑗𝑡
𝐸 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑗𝑡 + 𝛿𝑗 + 𝜈𝑡 + 𝑗𝑡            [3.4] 
?̂?𝑗𝑡  = 𝜅0 + 𝜅1𝐼𝑗𝑡
19−21 + 𝜅2𝐼𝑗𝑡
𝐸 + 𝜅3𝑋𝑗𝑡 + 𝛿𝑗 + 𝜈𝑡 + 𝑗𝑡  [3.5] 
?̂?𝑗𝑡  = 𝜇0 + 𝜇1𝐼𝑗𝑡
15−17 + 𝜇2𝐼𝑗𝑡
𝐸 + 𝜇3𝑋𝑗𝑡 + 𝛿𝑗 + 𝜈𝑡 + 𝑗𝑡  [3.6] 
𝐼𝑎1−𝑎2 and 𝐼𝐸 represent the primary variables of interest, with the former representing the share 
of the population aged  in municipality/district  that are migrants, and the latter the 
share of the working-age population who were migrants with educational attainment 𝐸 (𝐸 <
12, 𝐸 = 12 and 𝐸 > 12). In order to capture non-migrant’s exposure to migrant classmates 
(peer effects), equations [4.4] and [4.5] make use of migrants who changed their 
municipality/district at least three years prior to the time of the census while [4.6] makes use 
of migrants who changed their municipality/district at any time during the five years prior to 
the time of the census.  
Although a positive correlation between 𝐼𝑎1−𝑎2 and 𝐼𝐸  is expected (most migrant 
children move with their parents), it should be possible to identify their effects separately as 
not all working age migrants have children. 𝑋𝑗𝑡 is a vector of municipality/district-level 
characteristics that might be related to educational outcomes, including the: the unemployment 
rate; average per capita income; proportion of the population living in overcrowded 
households;21 proportion of the population that is male; and proportion of the population living 
in rural areas. All of these controls are entered in log form so as to allow for non-linearity. 
Regressions [3.4] – [3.6] are estimated using weights, 𝑤𝑗𝑡, computed as the inverse of the 
squared standard errors on 𝜃𝑗𝑡 , ?̂?𝑗𝑡 and ?̂?𝑗𝑡 from equations [3.1] – [3.3]. 
                                                     
21 Defined as a household in which the ratio of the household size to number of rooms is larger than two.  
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The regressions above are likely to suffer from endogeneity problems. For example, there are 
likely to be municipality/district factors that influence both migrant choice and educational 
outcomes, as well as a bidirectional relationship migration inflows and educational attainment. 
Including a lagged dependent variable as a control addresses issues of persistence and 
autocorrelation, yielding dynamic models: 
𝜃𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑗𝑡
15−18 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑗𝑡
𝐸 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽4𝜃𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑗 + 𝜈𝑡 + 𝑗𝑡  [3.7] 
?̂?𝑗𝑡  = 𝜅0 + 𝜅1𝐼𝑗𝑡
19−21 + 𝜅2𝐼𝑗𝑡
𝐸 + 𝜅3𝑋𝑗𝑡 + 𝜅4?̂?𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑗 + 𝜈𝑡 + 𝑗𝑡  [3.8] 
?̂?𝑗𝑡  = 𝜇0 + 𝜇1𝐼𝑗𝑡
15−17 + 𝜇2𝐼𝑗𝑡
𝐸 + 𝜇3𝑋𝑗𝑡 + 𝜇4?̂?𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑗 + 𝜈𝑡 + 𝑗𝑡  [3.9] 
An immediate problem with applying ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation to equations 
[3.7] to [3.9] is dynamic panel bias (Nickell, 1981), that is, the lagged dependent variable is 
correlated with time-invariant municipality/district factors.22 This can be corrected by purging 
the fixed effects using a first difference (FD) estimator: 
∆𝜃𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1∆𝐼𝑗𝑡
15−18 + 𝛽2∆𝐼𝑗𝑡
𝐸 + 𝛽3∆𝑋𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽4∆𝜃𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝜈𝑡 + ∆ 𝑗𝑡  [3.10] 
∆?̂?𝑗𝑡  = 𝜅0 + 𝜅1∆𝐼𝑗𝑡
19−21 + 𝜅2∆𝐼𝑗𝑡
𝐸 + 𝜅3∆𝑋𝑗𝑡 + 𝜅4∆?̂?𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝜈𝑡 + ∆ 𝑗𝑡 [3.11] 
∆?̂?𝑗𝑡  = 𝜇0 + 𝜇1∆𝐼𝑗𝑡
15−17 + 𝜇2∆𝐼𝑗𝑡
𝐸 + 𝜇3∆𝑋𝑗𝑡 + 𝜇4∆?̂?𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝜈𝑡 + ∆ 𝑗𝑡 [3.12] 






) as weights.  
However, even though fixed effects have been eliminated, the lagged dependent 
variable continues to be potentially endogenous through its correlation with ∆ 𝑗𝑡. Further 
endogeneity bias may also arise due to simultaneity between educational outcomes and migrant 
inflows, as well as the predetermined nature of several variables included in 𝑋 (that is, 
                                                     
22 Keele and Kelly (2006), however, show through means of Monte Carlo simulation that OLS with LDV 
produces the best estimates for modest (N = 50 – 150) samples sizes. 
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correlated with past and potentially current realisations of 𝑗𝑡). These issues are addressed using 
an Anderson and Hsiao (1982) levels estimator which takes first differences (FD) and then 
instruments potentially endogenous variables using lags of their own levels. However, lagged 
levels are often shown to be poor instruments if variables are close to a random walk 
(Roodman, 2009). To improve efficiency the Arellano-Bover/ Blundell-Bond (Arrelano & 
Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998, 2000) System Generalised Method of Moments (GMM-
SYS) estimator introduces more instruments by combining a system in the difference estimator 
(equations [3.10] – [3.12]) with levels as instruments, with the estimator in levels (equation 
[3.7] – [3.9]) with first differences as instruments.23  
3.6.1 Empirical results – effects of migrants on completion 
 
Tables 3.7 to 3.9 show results for the impact of the migrant share of a municipality/district 
population aged 6 to 64 years using the adjusted education outcomes as dependent variables. I 
begin with weighted least squares (WLS) estimation of equations [3.4] to [3.6]. Controlling for 
area and year fixed effects (column 1) and unemployment rates and non-migrant cohort 
(column 2), the coefficient on migration is estimated to be positive and statistically significant 
for primary school completion and secondary school enrolment, but small and statistically 
insignificant for secondary school completion. These coefficients remain robust to the 
inclusion of further controls for municipality/district level characteristics (column 3).  
The coefficients on both the youth and prime age unemployment rates are statistically 
significant in the case of the school completion rates, but not in the case of secondary school 
enrolment. As expected, indicators of wealthier and more economically developed 
municipalities/districts (log per capita income) are positively and significantly correlated with 
educational outcomes, although we can expect an upward bias in these coefficients due to bi-
                                                     
23 This is the same estimation approach adopted by Kollamparambil (2017) who analyses the impact of internal 
migration on income inequality.  
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directionality.  
A dynamic process in the LS regression is allowed for by including a lagged dependent 
variable, as in equations [3.7] to [3.9]. The results of this dynamic LS estimation are indicated 
in column 4 of Tables 3.7 – 3.9. The coefficient on migration is significantly decreased in the 
case of primary school completion and secondary school enrolment, with a significant negative 
coefficient emerging in the former. Following first-differencing that addresses endogeneity 
bias linked to time-invariant fixed effects (column 5), several coefficients increase in 
magnitude and significance.  
The estimates of the final model (equations [3.10] to [3.12]) that aims to address 
endogeneity issues linked to bi-directional causal relationships are indicated in column 6 of 
Tables 3.7 to 3.9. In all cases, the models pass the Hansen J-test of over identifying restrictions 
and the difference in Hansen test of exogeneity of instrument subsets. The positive and 
significant coefficient on the lagged dependent variable in all three models gives support for 
the persistent nature of regional education outcomes. No significant relationship between either 
primary-school completion or secondary-school enrolment and migration is estimated. 
However, the results in Table 3.8 indicate that a higher migrant share is related to significantly 
higher secondary school completion rates among non-migrants aged 19 to 21. Specifically, a 
percentage point increase in the migrant share is related to an increase in the secondary school 
completion rate of 1.8 percentage points. Furthermore, a positive and significant (at the 10% 
level) effect of the youth unemployment rate (ages 15-24) on the secondary school enrolment 
of non-migrant residents aged 15 to 17 is observed.  
 
3.6.2 The 'Transkei effect' 
 
Municipalities that incorporate districts of the former Transkei proper — the early 
adopters of the Glen Grey district council system — and districts in the former Pondoland are 
estimated to have significantly lower rates of primary school completion and secondary school 
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enrolment compared to the rest of the EC, including the former Ciskei, and the three other 
provinces under consideration (see columns 1 through 4 of Tables 3.7 to 3.9). Furthermore, 
parts of the Transkei that were transferred from the Ciskei decades after the establishment of 
the Transkeian Council System do not show significantly different educational outcomes from 
the Ciskei or non-homeland Eastern Cape.  
It is evident from comparing the results of the weighted LS regressions that some of the 
difference in educational outcomes between parts of the former Transkei and other regions can 
be explained by differences in demographic and socio-economic differences —noting that 
these too could be legacies of past policy; for example, high levels of unemployment linked to 
historical underdevelopment. The direction of change in the coefficients on the regional 
dummies indicate a positive correlation between socio-economic development and the Gauteng 
and WC regions, and a negative correlations with the Eastern Cape former homeland areas and 
parts of Kwa-Zulu Natal.  
Therefore, after accounting for all observed municipality/district heterogeneity 
(including migrant shares), persistence in educational outcomes, as well as adjusting 
educational outcomes at the individual level to account for home background factors, there 
remains a significant 'unexplained' Transkei direct effect on the educational outcomes of 
children and youth resident in the Transkei. It is unsurprising that, unlike Chapter 3, no 
significant difference is found between the estimated coefficient on the early and later adopters 
of DCs, since by 1927 all 27 Transkei districts had DCs. Therefore, it is not the timing of DC 
introduction that has persisted through time, but rather the long-lasting effect that the Glen 
Grey Act and succeeding policy had on the channel of migrant labour. In the case of secondary 
school completion rates, very little difference is observed across different regions, aside from 
Kwa-Zulu Natal that significantly outperforms all other regions. Following first-differencing 
that addresses endogeneity bias linked to time-invariant fixed effects (column 5), several 
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coefficients on variables of interest increase in magnitude and significance.  
 
Table 3.7: Regression results: dependent variable primary school completion rate of non-migrant 15-18 
year-olds (regression adjusted) 
 





Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Share population ages 





































Share of non-migrant 











Log pc income 




































































































Observations 171 171 171 114 57 114 
F 78.90*** 67.25*** 70.49*** 86.45*** 6.37*** 94.21*** 
R-squared 0.783 0.800 0.828 0.897 0.473  
# of groups      57 
# of instruments      14 
p-value Hansen test      0.617 
p-value Diff Hansen      0.543 
Notes: Estimation is by weighted least squares with weights w the inverse of the squared standard errors on the 
district/municipality-year interaction coefficients in the individual regression for columns 1-4 and 6, and 1/(1/wt +1/wt-1) for 
column 5. All specifications include census year dummies. The instruments in column 6 include: the levels and first differences 
of lagged dependent variable and the share population ages 6 to 64 that is migrant; levels of: unemployment rate ages 15-24; 
unemployment rate, ages 25-54; share of non-migrant population, ages 15-18; log per capita income; log overcrowding; log 
male; log rural; and year dummies. Robust standard errors are indicated in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
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Table 3.8: Regression results: dependent variable secondary school completion rate of non-migrant 19-21 











Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Share population ages 
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Observations 171 171 171 114 57 114 
F 69.64*** 65.19*** 98.71*** 109.55*** 2.57** 55.30*** 
R-squared 0.806 0.835 0.914 0.938 0.319  
# of groups      57 
# of instruments      14 
p-value Hansen test      0.234 
p-value Diff Hansen      0.211 
Notes: Estimation is by weighted least squares with weights w the inverse of the squared standard errors on the 
district/municipality-year interaction coefficients in the individual regression for columns 1-4 and 6, and 1/(1/wt +1/wt-1) for 
column 5. All specifications include census year dummies. The instruments in column 6 include: the levels and first differences 
of lagged dependent variable and share population ages 6 to 64 that is migrant; levels of: unemployment rate ages 15-24; 
unemployment rate ages 25-54; share of non-migrant population ages 19-21; log per capita income; log overcrowding; log 
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Table 3.9: Regression results: dependent variable secondary school enrolment rate of non-migrant 15-17 
year-olds (regression adjusted) 
  






Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Share population ages 6 
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Observations 171 171 171 114 57 114 
F 158.49 135.05*** 126.78*** 71.61*** 4.13*** 48.45*** 
R-squared 0.890 0.898 0.908 0.877 0.321  
# of groups      57 
# of instruments      16 
p-value Hansen test      0.107 
p-value Diff Hansen      0.785 
Notes: Estimation is by weighted least squares with weights w the inverse of the squared standard errors on the 
district/municipality-year interaction coefficients in the individual regression for columns 1, 2, 3 and 5, and 1/(1/wt +1/wt-1) 
for column 4. All specifications include census year dummies. The instruments in column 5 include: the levels and first 
differences of: lagged dependent variable, share population ages 6 to 64 that is migrant and unemployment rate ages 15-24; 
levels of: unemployment rate ages 25-54; share of non-migrant population ages 15-17; log per capita income; log 
overcrowding; log male; log rural; and year dummies. Robust standard errors are indicated in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 
0.05, *p < 0.1. 
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This chapter investigated the relationship between internal migration and primary and 
secondary completion rates in several South African provinces with an emphasis on the Eastern 
Cape (EC). Following accepted practice, I used an instrumental variables approach to address 
endogeneity concerns of local internal migration and to control for possible environmental 
influences related to family socio-economic backgrounds. 
This chapter provides evidence that internal migration does affect non-migrant education 
outcomes, although the overall effects are indistinct, as is indicated in the relevant literature 
(e.g. Ballatore, et al. 2018; Schneeweis, 2015; Hunt, 2017). Specifically, I have shown that 15 
to 18 year-old non-migrants’ probability of completing primary school and 15 to 17 year-old 
non-migrants’ probability of being enrolled are not affected by the migration of 6 to 64 year-
olds.  
Table 3.9 shows that education outcomes are not only affected by recent migration but 
also by historical shocks: the dummy variable for DCs reveal a large, negative and statistically 
significant coefficient.  In other words, the regions where DCs existed (Transkei DC and 
Transkei Pondoland) are shown to have the weakest completion performance compared to 
Ciskei and the rest of the EC. 
Previous scholars have noted the large discrepancies in quality between Transkei and 
white education (e.g. Davis, 1968; Paterson, 1992; Duff, 2011). Despite the fact that DCs 
contributed to raising enrolment and attendance, white schools still had better pass rates (Blue 
Books, 1893-1909). It may, therefore, not be surprising that this chapter found that non-
migrants in early DCs have the lowest completion rates of all four EC regions, and that even 
when conditioning on socioeconomic factors at the local municipal and district levels, the 
weakest school completion rates are estimated for former-DC regions.  
The Glen Grey Act may have prompted waves of migration as people left the area in 
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order to raise money to pay the labour tax, thereby reducing the number of labourers, human 
capital and potential production capacity in former DCs. Selective migration could have 
occurred as healthier, stronger and more educated people left the DC regions. Because health 
and aptitude amongst other characteristics tend to be inherited, the early differences created in 
DCs could have continued over time. Therefore migration is hypothesised as a potential 
pathway through which the Glen Grey Act may have indirectly impacted present day education 
outcomes in former DCs and in other regions where migrants have moved to over time.   
Least squares regression results showed that even after controlling for migration and 
other socio-economic factors that affect migration and education, there is still an unexplained 
effect that is impacting education outcomes in the Transkei completion. This unexplained part 
could be historical migration, although I am unable to confirm this as I do not accurate 
historical data showing patterns of migration to and from the Transkei. Nonetheless, the data 
that I do have on current migration is not able to explain the full DC effect. 
This chapter has also shown the importance of history in analysing present day economic 
outcomes. The persistent migration seen today in South Africa generally, and the Transkei 
specifically, has been influenced by colonial policies that can be traced back to the passage of 
the Glen Grey Act. These policies have been argued to have influenced cultural norms that 
explain the persistence of migration from the Eastern Cape. The findings that former DCs have 
the highest levels of migration and lowest completion rates are important as they add to works 
that emphasize the importance of historical policy shocks for long-term development outcomes. 
The findings also add to the works that consider migration as a channel of policy shock 
persistence and emphasise the role of selection in influencing economic outcomes (e.g. Fourie 
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CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSION 
In this dissertation, I examined three research questions relating to Cape Colony democratic 
reversal, Transkei black colonial education and the relationship between migration and present 
day education outcomes. The three chapters of this dissertation are linked by policies related 
to democratic reversal and political and economic exclusion. The Cape Parliamentary 
Registration Act and Franchise and Ballot Act were clear attempts by the Cape Parliament to 
reduce black voter numbers, in response to a large increase in the black population that had 
recently become Cape citizens. 
Summary of main findings 
The dissertation’s first contribution was to exploit an individual-level source of cross-sectional 
and time series information – the Cape Colony voters’ rolls – to extract basic biographical 
data, mainly on black males and question the accuracy of the literature on black 
disenfranchisement in the Cape Colony. The objective of the chapter was to draw a definitive 
conclusion as to how many were removed from the Cape Colony voters’ rolls. Debates on the 
effectiveness of late nineteenth-century Cape Colony black voter disenfranchisement 
continued throughout much of the twentieth century. Historians and political commentators 
all contributed to the discourse, with varying claims being made regarding the effectiveness 
of the measures. The problem with these claims is that they are not supported by evidence. 
I used the Cape Colony voters’ rolls, Cape Colony Blue Books and Statistical Registers 
to investigate the changing accounts of mass voter disenfranchisement. Previous authors 
maintained that 30,000 black voters had been disqualified by the 1887 Parliamentary 
Registration Act. By analysing the Eastern electoral division’s voters’ rolls, I showed the 
number of black people disenfranchised by the 1887 Act to be less than 4,000. 
The burden of these suffrage attacks the falls overwhelmingly on black people, but I 
found that poor white people were also affected. As the Cape was dealing with what it termed 
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the ‘poor white problem’ it seems some of these white people were inadvertently on the wrong 
end of legislation not meant for them. This may have given rise to the racialized thinking that 
would become a hallmark of South Africa’s twentieth century. 
I also showed that, while the legislation was effective in reducing the number of black 
voters in the short term, black voter numbers rose again after a few years. I argued that this 
may be because black voters reacted to the higher qualifications in various ways; one of those 
strategies was to acquire literacy, a topic I developed further in Chapter 3. 
In Chapter Two, I investigated the effects of DCs on black primary school enrolment 
and attendance. I showed that black education outcomes in DC areas experienced growth over 
and above that of non-council districts. These DCs increased cooperation at a local level 
between parents, missionaries and the Cape government, as black parents were proactive in 
the development of better schools for their children. The findings of the chapter contribute to 
our understanding of fiscal decentralisation and local government, black colonial education 
and black agency.  
In Chapter Three, I investigated the relationship between internal migration and 
primary and secondary school completion rates. I found that contemporary migration has no 
impact on non-migrant primary completion but has both positive effects on non-migrant 
secondary completion and secondary enrolment. Chapter 3 also argued that persistent 
migration is one the legacies of the Glen Grey Act. I also showed that persistence of migration 
as a cultural norm was triggered by the passage of the Glen Grey Act and shows a persistent 
effect of the Glen Grey Act on education outcomes today.  
The Glen Grey Act was key in disenfranchising black people, segregating them, and 
restructuring their local governance structures, whilst creating mechanisms that generated a 
pool of oscillating migrant labourers/ labour reserves. These labourers needed to possess a 
certain level of skills that were required in the economy. The Transkei today is still the biggest 
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source of migration in the country, with migration mainly driven by job searches and the desire 
to access better schooling. Though there was an increase in education access for black people 
in the Transkei, the curriculum was determined by the Cape education department. Thus black 
education quality remained inferior to that of white pupils in the rest of the Cape Colony. 
However, black education in the Transkei was better than it was for black people in the rest 
of South Africa. Black people in the Orange Free State and the Transvaal had inferior access 
education to black people in the Transkei (Seroto, 1999).  The persistence of policies can occur 
through mediating channels. Although the District Council institutions have not persisted, I 
argue that out-migration has. We cannot measure the direct effects of the Glen Grey on 
education outcomes, but we can hypothesise about indirect, alternative pathways that colonial 
policy impacts outcomes today. Inequality in education completion in various parts of South 
Africa can be partly explained by migration as colonial policies have had indirect lasting 
effects on present day outcomes. 
 
Main contributions of the dissertation 
This dissertation highlights the importance of empirical work in economic history. It 
provides new evidence to correct a longstanding false narrative about the scale of black 
disenfranchisement. My extensive and accurate review of the work of past historians reveals 
the error that has led historians to take a false position on the past. We need to question 
historical accounts of colonial events as doing so can contribute to decolonising long accepted 
narratives about African development. 
The dissertation also makes important contributions to a number of literatures, namely 
the link between democracy and education, the literature on fiscal decentralisation, and a 
literature of historical persistence of events. The interdisciplinary approaches used in this 
paper has allowed me to provide new insights across diverse fields of study.   
This dissertation has also highlighted the need to preserve democratic participation in 
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the political process. Democracy should be treasured; disenfranchisement not only hurts those 
that are excluded from the vote, but, as this dissertation has shown, could lead to unexpected 
and unforeseen long-run consequences that is detrimental to development. The reversal of 
democratisation need not have large disenfranchising effects if the targeted population 
mobilised in resistance as was seen in the Cape Colony.  
The dissertation has also contributed to changing previously static perceptions of colonial 
education policy in the Transkei – the narrative is changing to emphasise black agency in 
improving their own education outcomes. Though institutions (DCs) are at times created for 
self-serving purposes (by the Cape government), they can be used by those receiving them for 
progress and development (black primary education). Thus democratic reversal need not lead 
to regression in the education of those disenfranchised.  
Chapter 2 made unique contributions to the literature that studies democratisation and 
education. Several studies find a positive link between democratisation and increased access to 
education (e.g. Ansell, 2010; Harding and Stasavage 2014). Paglayan’s (2020) cross country 
study that used data spanning 200 years produced a null finding that “democratisation had no 
or little impact on primary school enrolment rates” because education expansion can occur 
under autocratic regimes. I believe that by studying a shorter time frame in Chapter 2, I added 
to the debates on the relationship between democratisation and education. That is, in the short 
term at least, democratic reversal can be associated with education expansion. Thus my 
education expansion finding is contrary to Naidu (2012) and Henderson (2017) who found that 
disenfranchisement negatively impacted education.  
Several recent works (e.g. Bartolini et al. 2016, Kim et al. 2018 Lakomaa at. al 2019 and 
Stegarescu, 2020) have highlighted the importance of local taxation powers for decentralised 
regions for increasing efficiency of resource allocation, improves the speed at which local 
policy is implemented. I add to this literature by showing the effectiveness of local government 
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fiscal under conditions of democratic reversal - District Councils increased choice for Transkei 
residents regards to how their taxes were spent – taxes raised were used for what residents 
wanted, which was more education.  
 Chapter 2 also makes contributions to the literature that studies political and fiscal 
decentralisation under different types of regimes. By decentralising, governments cede a 
certain amount of political and financial control regions and increases their risk of losing power 
(Busygina at. al 2018). I show that incumbent political authority can decentralise and retain 
power as they prevent certain regions from participating in elections.  
Chapter 3 makes contributions to several literatures. Firstly, I showed the importance 
of migration for education outcomes (e.g. Hunt, 2017).  
Secondly, I showed how I showed how migration persistence in South Africa is the 
linked to Cape Colony policy (Glen Grey Act) that was passed to generate a pool of migrant 
labour for the colonial economy (e.g. Carpio at. al 2020 and Sequiera, 2020). This migration 
is shown to impact education outcomes in the present day. 
 
Suggestions for future research 
I suggest three topics for future research. Firstly, I used the Cape Parliament debates to 
give context, specifically on the issue of disenfranchisement. These debates are rich in 
statistics and information about the policy positions of legislators. The debates, however, have 
not used been for empirical political-economic analysis. The names of the legislators of both 
the House of Assembly and the Legislative Council are available and their voting decisions 
could be analysed. One could investigate whether legislators represent their own 
constituencies, or are acting on behalf of specific interest groups. 
One can also determine if the legislator’s background or political party affiliation plays 
any part in his voting behaviour. Some of the models in the literature have been used to predict 
future voting behaviour and help us understand the reasons why legislators voted in certain 
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ways. These are issues addressed in the literature on political economy but there is little if any 
evidence for Africa at all, let alone for the colonial period. 
Secondly, the Superintendent’s Reports on Education contain detailed information for 
the whole Cape Colony on pass rates, by grade, of primary-school pupils for a number of years 
between 1893 and 1903. If transcribed, they could be used to compare trends in pass rates by 
district or town. One could also test the effect of shocks such as the South African War, 
drought, or disease on a student’s performance. Finally, as education policy and curriculum 
changed in the 1890s, regression discontinuity models could be used to analyse the pass rates. 
 Thirdly, the Transkei Territories Council’s financial statements and income and 
expenditure accounts are available in the Statistical Registers and Cape Colony Blue Books 
and in the Umtata Archives Repository in the Eastern Cape. The Archives hold the majority 
of the Councils’ records. The records in the repository are in poor condition due to years of 
neglect and using them would be challenging. They could, however, be used to study the 
fiscal history of the councils and provide insights on the sustainability of Rhodes’ experiment. 
A study of the councils’ finances could be undertaken for the entire history of their existence 
(nearly 60 years). We could also get a better understanding of the administrative dynamics 
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Table A1: Changes in learner numbers and school numbers, 2000 and 2013 
 Number of learners Number of schools 
 





2000 2006 2013 
Eastern Cape Municipalities and Metropoles: 
Alfred Nzo 225 765 217 205 188 469 -1.38% 715 721 742 
Chris Hani 212 327 187 271 145 308 -2.88% 741 760 768 
Amathole 216 818 205 958 146 058 -2.99% 943 976 990 
OR Tambo 352 640 355 650 299 605 -1.25% 1 063 1 082 1 090 
Joe Gqabi 84 790 72 498 59 769 -2.65% 293 295 294 
Sarah Baartman 56 492 54 736 56 901 0.06% 202 208 210 
Nelson Mandela Bay 135 190 130 184 129 358 -0.34% 212 233 234 
Buffalo City 116 211 106 329 102 041 -1.00% 304 322 332 
Missing/unspecified 97 169 28 139 10 362 -15.82% 837 419 177 
All Eastern Cape 1 497 402 1 357 970 1 137 871 -2.09% 5 310 5 016 4 847 
Transkei magisterial districts: 
Bizana 59 263 61 362 56 772 -0.33% 142 143 147 
Butterworth 21 602 20 603 14 681 -2.93% 103 110 104 
Cala 15 812 12 585 8 898 -4.33% 59 59 58 
Cofimvaba 30 824 27 217 17 279 -4.35% 116 114 107 
Elliot 4 032 4 388 3 731 -0.60% 14 17 16 
Elliotdale 21 888 26 482 23 257 0.47% 83 86 86 
Engcobo 52 680 49 282 38 502 -2.38% 181 178 174 
Flagstaff 51 929 55 595 48 937 -0.46% 152 153 151 
Idutywa 30 591 29 889 21 552 -2.66% 123 126 125 
Kentani 27 084 26 540 15 323 -4.29% 98 107 107 
Lady Frere/Glen Grey 34 107 26 418 18 628 -4.55% 151 137 128 
Libode 111 648 117 857 105 200 -0.46% 334 330 341 
Maclear 5 226 5 184 5 098 -0.19% 17 17 17 
Maluti 30 428 28 084 26 019 -1.20% 97 97 101 
Mount Ayliff 23 300 24 271 19 973 -1.18% 86 88 88 
Mount Fletcher 40 244 34 221 23 903 -3.93% 175 172 162 
Mount Frere 43 572 38 688 28 336 -3.26% 174 173 175 
Mqanduli 31 618 33 025 25 333 -1.69% 96 98 97 
Ngqeleni 44 363 43 732 35 167 -1.77% 132 131 130 
Nqamakwe 22 672 20 675 12 523 -4.46% 115 121 121 
Qumbu 33 877 28 794 19 519 -4.15% 133 131 130 
Tabankulu 42 399 38 332 31 352 -2.30% 131 133 133 
Tsolo 30 385 24 887 18 436 -3.77% 114 114 113 
Tsomo 16 849 15 108 9190 -4.56% 87 88 87 
Umtata 63 213 61 780 53 821 -1.23% 178 191 194 
Umzimkulu 50 848 424 456  149 2 3 
Willowvale 33 082 34 028 18 015 -4.57% 133 136 135 
All Transkei 922 064 889 027 699 445 -2.11% 3 224 3 250 3 227 
Notes: own calculations using SNAP Survey data for 2000, 2006 and 2013.  
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Table A2: Descriptive statistics of variables included in first stage regression analysis of probability of completing primary school (age group 15–18) 
 Eastern Cape  Gauteng, Kwa-Zulu Natal and Western Cape 
 Non-migrants  Recent migrants  Non-migrants  Recent migrants 
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 Eastern Cape  Gauteng, Kwa-Zulu Natal and Western Cape 
 Non-migrants  Recent migrants  Non-migrants  Recent migrants 



















































Household composition                

































































































































Number of observations 50 300 53 426 47 903  2 187 1 859 1 827  107 299 135 880 152 300  18 658 10 594 11 299 
Notes: own calculations using Census 1996, 2001 and 2011. The variables listed are used to estimate municipal and district average primary-school completion rates in the 
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Table A3: Descriptive statistics of variables included in first stage regression analysis of probability of completing secondary school (age group 19–21) 
 Eastern Cape  Gauteng, Kwa-Zulu Natal and Western Cape 
 Non-migrants  Recent migrants  Non-migrants  Recent migrants 
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 Eastern Cape  Gauteng, Kwa-Zulu Natal and Western Cape 
 Non-migrants  Recent migrants  Non-migrants  Recent migrants 



















































Household composition                


































































































































Number of observations 30 601 30 915 30 262  2 059 1 812 2 114  77 754 94 625 117 908  19 398 13 843 19 009 
Notes: own calculations using Census 1996, 2001 and 2011. The variables listed are used to estimate municipal and district average secondary-school completion rates in the 
first-stage estimation. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Coefficient on share of population ages 6-64 migrant (migrancy in general) 
Household head has…      

































Coefficient on share of population ages 6-17 migrant (school aged migrants) 
Household head has…      

































Unemployment rates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Share of non-migrant population 
ages 15-17  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Area dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Economic/sociodemographic 
indicators 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Lagged dependent variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: The dependent variable is the share of non-migrants ages 15 to 17 who are enrolled in secondary schooling, adjusted at 
the individual level for age, gender, race and household characteristics. Estimation is by weighted least squares with weights 
w the inverse of the squared standard errors on the district/municipality–year interaction coefficients in the individual 
regression for Columns 1-3 and 5, and 1/(1/wt +1/wt-1) for Column 4. All specifications include census year dummies. Robust 
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Figure A1: Topographic map of the Transkei 
Source: Htonl (2010) 
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